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Since 2000, and with increased focus after the announcement of the One Belt, 
One Road initiative in 2015, China has led the development of a robust infrastructure 
program in South Asia. Despite being promoted by China as the creation of a win-win 
environment throughout the Indian Ocean region, realist scholars argue that China’s 
motivations are to utilize this infrastructure to create overseas bases, threaten India’s 
perceived sphere of influence, and increase Chinese influence by challenging the regional 
order. When viewed through a liberal lens, the initiative creates opportunities for 
common development, encourages multilateral growth, and addresses failures that current 
global and regional institutions have been unable to overcome. This thesis assesses both 
arguments and answers the question: Do China’s motivations seem more consistent with 
a realist or liberal lens? 
My research found that when assessed under a four-aspect framework that 
addresses the potential economic, geopolitical, and security-related effects of the 
initiative on South Asia, the liberal argument provided stronger evidence and produced a 
narrative more aligned with China’s economic needs. By deciding through which lens to 
view China’s motivations, great powers in the region can best assess how to address these 
programs and either challenge or support China. 
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The One Belt, One Road initiative (OBOR or Belt and Road) was introduced by 
the Chinese government in 2015. The initiative increases China’s economic ties within 
the South Asia–Indian Ocean Region (SA-IOR) by merging previous infrastructure 
projects: the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the New Silk Road Economic Belt, 
both of which were proposed in 2013.1 Through this new strategy, China looks to 
develop closer relationships with its South Asian neighbors in order to promote a win-
win environment through infrastructure advances and stronger trade relations.2 Belt and 
Road continues a legacy of more than 10 years of Chinese-led projects throughout South 
Asia and is proof of a new focus and enhanced investment in the region. 
As China continues to deepen these economic relations behind the OBOR 
initiative, liberal theorists argue that Beijing is seeking to create a positive sum game in 
which China and its South Asian neighbors mutually benefit through increased trade 
capabilities, stronger financial institutions, and multilateral economic corridors. 
Nevertheless, realists argue that Beijing is utilizing this strategy to develop regional 
dominance, challenge the current regional order, and create opportunities for overseas 
basing throughout the Indian Ocean basin. This thesis assesses both arguments and 
answers the question: Do China’s motivations seem more consistent with a realist or 
liberal lens? 
In doing so, I utilized a common framework for both lenses that assessed China’s 
motivations through four aspects of Belt and Road’s perceived effect on South Asia. The 
four aspects sought to review the political, economic, and security issues surrounding the 
program by addressing the following questions: Does Belt and Road only advance 
China’s national interests? How influential does Belt and Road make China in South 
Asia? What is the possibility of the militarization of Chinese-constructed maritime 
                                                 
1 “Chronology of China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiatives,” Xinhuanet, February 5, 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-02/05/c_133972101.htm. 
2 Yun Sun, “Inserting Africa Into China’s One Belt, One Road Strategy: A New Opportunity for Jobs 
and Infrastructure?,” Brookings Institute, March 2, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-
focus/posts/2015/03/02-africa-china-jobs-infrastructure-sun. 
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infrastructure? Is China challenging the existing global and regional economic order? 
 Overall, my research concluded that in each of the four aspects the liberal lens 
provides stronger evidence, while the realist lens is rooted primarily in speculation. 
Coupled with the belief that the initiative is, as Beijing promises, designed to increase 
economic growth both in and around China, the liberal lens provides a more rational and 
better-supported answer to the question concerning China’s motivations. Through the 
four-aspect framework, I found little evidence demonstrating that infrastructure advances 
a Sino-centric agenda, creates market dependencies for smaller states, provides the 
possibility for overseas bases, or promotes multilateral development banks that challenge 
western-led institutions. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Over the past 15 years, but greatly increasing since President Xi Jinping’s arrival 
in office in 2012 and his introduction of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and New 
Silk Road Economic Belt the following year, China has initiated a robust transportation 
and trade related infrastructure development program throughout South Asia. For China, 
the South Asian states, and the United States, the strategy has great significance in their 
collective and individual economic, strategic, and geopolitical future. By deciding 
through which lens to view China’s recent involvement, the United States and its South 
Asian allies can craft a response that will either challenge or encourage China to remain 
within the global norms and institutions previously established. Until the South Asian 
community understands China’s motivations, it cannot respond appropriately.  
In China’s case, the significance is the potential for tremendous economic gain, 
positive political influence, and increased border security. Seeking to create a win-win 
situation that enhances the fiscal capacity of its South Asian neighbors, Beijing claims 
that its peaceful rise, through programs such as OBOR, is an opportunity to demonstrate 
its ability to act as a responsible great power in both economic and political leadership 
roles.3 In addition, China views the South Asian investment as a chance to stabilize its 
                                                 
3 Wang Jisi. “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” International and 
Strategic Studies 73 (2012): 8, http://www.iiss.pku.edu.cn/Article.aspx?id=f88ecabd-29d7-4f13-9b35-
e0de05a74679. 
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borders and develop its western states. In concert with Beijing’s Western Development 
Strategy, a domestic policy adopted in 2000 to promote growth in China’s lagging 
western regions and provinces, the OBOR strategy seeks to enact a foreign policy 
strategy to complement and build on the domestic program’s success. Through trade 
relations with partners in South and Central Asia, China observed a growth in volume of 
30-fold from 2001 to 2011.4 The continuation of these efforts under OBOR has the 
potential to fuel development, and in turn, stabilize China’s western regions and 
provinces, previously hindered by ethnic separatism and religious extremism.5 
Of course, while the significance to China is greater economic opportunities, 
political prowess, and national security, the significance to the region is the emergence of 
either an economically lucrative and powerful ally, as seen through a liberal lens, or, 
when viewed through a realist lens, a dominating and challenging force. Until Beijing’s 
arrival, the India-Pakistan rivalry dominated foreign relations within South Asia. The 
introduction of a new great and rising power changes the dynamics of the half-century 
struggle through new alliances and economic claims set to be drawn. 
From New Delhi’s perspective, Beijing’s increasing trade agreements and 
promises of advanced infrastructure for the surrounding South Asian states creates deep 
fears about China’s motivations. With tensions already strained between the two states 
from previous military engagements over border issues, many Indians view China’s 
actions as a “creeping encirclement” and a challenge to India’s South Asian sphere of 
influence.6 Nevertheless, a recent proposal for a Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Cooperation (BCIM) shows the possibility that India might be reconsidering 
its theories on Beijing’s realist motivations.7 
For the smaller players in the region—Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and 
Myanmar—the arrival of Chinese wealth and construction capacity means the elimination 
                                                 
4 Wang Jisi. “Marching Westwards,” 3. 
5 Ibid., 4.  
6 John W. Garver, “The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia,” Orbis 56, no. 3 (2012): 392. 
7 Manish Vaid and Tridivesh Singh Maini, “BCIM: Can India Be a Driving Force?,” Diplomat, 
January 01, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/bcim-can-india-be-a-driving-force/. 
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of previous bottlenecks in economic development.8 An influx in capital and resources 
provides not only new infrastructure but also a powerful ally for these weaker states. 
Nevertheless, if viewed through a realist lens, these same actions create market 
dependencies that might limit the sovereignty of these states. 
In addition, due to America’s continued interest in the region, Beijing’s actions in 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin makes one question if this is a desire to challenge 
Washington’s influence. In addition to the creation of new Chinese-led financial 
institutions that test the regional economic order, U.S. naval strategists fear Chinese 
expansion is motivated by a desire to create a “String of Pearls,” strategically placed 
naval bases throughout the Indian Ocean.9 While China’s intentions concerning maritime 
strategy remain unclear, the debate over Beijing’s motives drive American policy to 
expend the resources needed to monitor Chinese actions and develop relationships within 
the region, specifically closer ties with India, to counter any future threat to U.S. 
maritime security or economic opportunities in the SA-IOR.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous literature on this topic is divided into three categories: broader 
discussions on the realist and liberal schools within International Relations, analysis of 
China’s economic and infrastructure within South Asia, and public statements by the 
Chinese government and media outlets. I utilized each category to define the realist and 
liberal lenses and create the framework to assess them. 
1. Defining the Realist and Liberal Lenses 
Realist theorists see the world as an anarchical state of affairs in which states vie 
for power under the assumption that all international relations are a great zero-sum 
                                                 
8 Keith Johnson, “China, Sri Lanka, and the Maritime Great Game,” Foreign Policy,  February 12, 
2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/12/china-sri-lanka-and-the-maritime-great-game-silk-road-xi-port/. 
9 Johnson, “China, Sri Lanka, and the Maritime Great Game”; Jeff M. Smith, “Beware China’s Grand 
Strategy: How Obama Can Set the Right Red Lines,” Foreign Affairs, May 20, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-20/beware-chinas-grand-strategy. 
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game.10 As Stephen M. Walt summarizes, “[Realism] depicts international affairs as a 
struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the 
prospects for eliminating conflict and war.”11 Yet, under the realist umbrella, different 
interpretations of a state’s actions produce variations to the classical theory, and these 
interpretations, as I will briefly discuss, provide differing perspectives on a state’s 
motivations. 
Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz concur that the anarchical world is a power 
struggle among self-interested states, but argue that states do not seek to maximize 
authority, and instead look to “maintain their position in the system.”12 As a result, states 
often look to balance against, and not bandwagon with, powerful states because increased 
supremacy does not guarantee security.13 Offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, 
argue that great powers are continuously seeking authority and security in a zero-sum 
game. In addition, these states fear other great powers and maintain a goal of regional 
hegemony, to be the lone great power in a region.14 Once states become a regional 
hegemony, they seek to create competition among other potential regional hegemonies to 
eliminate the possibility of “peer competitors.”15 When these tenets are operationalized, 
the difference lies in the decision to engage in behavior that either maximizes power or 
maintains security. These differing interpretations present concepts such as “Phase Zero 
Operations” and “road diplomacy,” which will be addressed in following chapters. 
Where realism defines the world as an anarchical power grab, liberalism offers 
theories that promotes the interdependence of states through economic exchange, global 
                                                 
10 Thomas G. Moore, “Racing to Integrate, or Cooperating to Compete? Liberal and Realist 
Interpretations of China’s New Multilateralism,” in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, eds., China 
Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 
37. 
11 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 
(Spring 1998), pp. 31. 
12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979), 126. 
13 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 
14 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001), 29–32; John J. Mearsheimer, “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi,” Foreign Policy 146 (Jan/Feb 
2005): 48. 
15 Mearsheimer, “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi,” 48. 
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institutions, and societal norms. A key distinction between realism and liberalism is the 
realist view that global interactions are zero-sum and the liberal belief that global 
interdependence encourages positive-sum interactions between states. 
As defined by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “interdependence affects 
world politics and the behavior of states…by creating or accepting procedures, rules, or 
institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational 
and interstate relations.”16 Similar to concepts presented by President Woodrow Wilson 
at the end of the WWI in the form of the League of Nations, and implemented by 
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and President Harry Truman when developing a post-
world order after WWII, these ideas describe a system in which globalization unites 
states both economically and diplomatically. Through this interdependence, states operate 
under a theory of comparative advantage in which growth is measured in terms of win-
win solutions.  
Under the liberal school of thought, three aspects best define the lens used to view 
Beijing’s motivations: first, interdependency places binding constraints on a state’s 
behavior; second, the demonstration of a state’s commitment to the international 
community is displayed by its desire to seek out and engage international governmental 
organizations; and third, the development of new leadership within a global community 
does not constitute a complete revisionist agenda. These points are addressed in the 
works of Andrew Moravcisk, Justin S. Hempso-Jones, and John G. Ikenberry, 
respectively and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.  
2. China’s Motivations through a Liberal and Realist Lens 
When viewing the effects of the OBOR strategy through a realist or liberal lens, 
Beijing’s motives are framed in one of two ways: China is intent on developing an 
economic system that promotes mutual economic success for all South Asian states, or 
the Middle Kingdom is looking to establish a regional hegemony and draw South Asia 
into its sphere of influence. With a general acceptance among scholars that China’s rise is 
                                                 
16 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston: Longman, 
2012), 5. 
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significant and affecting the international order, other authors have attempted to explain 
China’s aspirations through a lens that measures either China’s acceptance to current 
institutions and global norms or desire to compete. Building on these arguments, I will 
assess Beijing’s motives by focusing on the level of economic interdependence and 
equality of the pro-sum system for all South Asian states in the OBOR structure. 
In a similar argument, Thomas Moore asks how the world can best interpret 
China’s rush to integrate itself into the multilateral world?17 Framing Chinese growth 
through an integration versus competition model, Moore argues both sides of the debate 
by providing a liberal and realist perspective. In favor of liberalism, he points to China’s 
“pursuit of institutionalized cooperation” as evidence of Beijing’s desire to work within 
the confines of the world order to promote cooperation and multilateral growth.18 The 
realist perspective counters this argument by concluding that China’s interest in 
multilateralism is for the purpose of gaining “coercive power and political influence.”19 
While Moore’s use of realist and liberal lenses to analyze China’s integration into global 
institutions is similar, my research seeks to use these lenses to analyze China’s 
infrastructure developments in South Asia by assessing the projects’ ability to advance 
Chinese national interests, bind China and its neighbors economically and politically, 
create overseas bases, and reform regional and global institutions. 
Additional literature that analyzes different aspects of China’s behavior, but under 
a strictly liberal lens, points to Beijing’s incorporation into established global institutions 
as proof of the state’s desire to accept international norms.20 John Ikenberry concludes 
that China is utilizing the current global institutions to advance its interest. He argues that 
Beijing’s recent success demonstrates both to itself and to the rest of the world that there 
is not a need to deviate from “the rules and institutions of international order.”21 A 
                                                 
17 Moore, “Racing to Integrate, or Cooperating to Compete?,” 48. 
18 Ibid., 36. 
19 Ibid., 48. 
20 Ibid. 
21 G. John Ickenberry, “The Rise of China, the United States, and the Future of the Liberal 
International Order.” In David Shambaugh, eds., Tangled Titans: The United States and China (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2013): 71. 
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discussion on China’s ability to operate within global institutions and norms is necessary 
to conclude liberal motivations behind the OBOR strategy. A failure by China to remain 
with these norms could indicate a desire to turn OBOR growth into a tool for regional 
dominance. 
Unlike liberal theorists, realists argue that China’s actions are only the beginning 
of greater aspirations. Where liberals believe that Beijing’s turn toward multilateralism 
are indicative of its foreign policy, realists argue that these developments are simply 
precursors that lead to regional hegemony as power and influence increase. The 
development of infrastructure and trade agreements with weaker and less influential 
states places China in a position to dictate economic and political policy within South 
Asia. As Mearsheimer concludes, “[China’s] ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—the only 
great power in the system…China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United 
States dominates the Western Hemisphere.”22  
Additionally, China recognizes that India, the world’s largest democracy, is the 
only nation capable of threatening is hegemonic aspirations in South Asia. Realists, along 
with Indian leaders, argue that Chinese-built infrastructure is strategically placed to flank 
India’s borders.23 Should Beijing choose, all previously designated commercial ports 
would have the capacity to act as naval bases in key strategic locations. 
Where Ikenberry and Mearsheimer utilize a clear liberal or realist lens, John 
Garver, Elizabeth Economy, M. Taylor Fravel, Jonathan Holslag, and Robert Sutter fall 
on a middle ground when defining Chinese motivations in a liberal or realist context. 
Much of this literature depicts an expanding China that is seeking greater significance 
and opportunity outside of its borders. Unlike the extreme realist or liberal views that see 
China either aggressively seeking hegemonic status or promoting global interdependence, 
these authors see China’s rise as an attempt to challenge pre-conceived notions of 
American dominance and look to develop a path to leadership within the current order.  
                                                 
22 Mearsheimer, “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi,” 48. 
23 Garver, “The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia,” 392. 
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Arguments presented by Holslag, Garver, and Economy, see the development of 
Chinese-funded infrastructure to be part of a deliberate strategy to utilize market 
opportunities for regional growth. While Holslag and Economy acknowledge China’s 
self-proclaimed liberal motivations, all three authors provide similar realist conclusions 
arguing that China’s intentions are to maximize interdependence opportunities to increase 
regional influence.24 
Leaning more toward a liberal lens, Fravel and Sutter argue that China’s 
dependence on an economic positive sum strategy continues to drive Beijing’s 
motivations.25 While both recognize that China’s rise will demand greater influence in 
global, and more specifically South Asian, affairs, their interpretations promote a need 
for China to continue with an interdependent, win-win strategy, and therefore refrain 
from realist motivations. 
3. The Chinese Perspective 
The final group contains literature from Chinese officials and media outlets. The 
central piece of documentation released by the Chinese government is the OBOR strategy 
paper, titled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road.” Released by the PRC in March 2015, this document 
outlines the principles and framework of Belt and Road by presenting China’s desires and 
intentions for the project. Highlighting a desire for “peace, development, cooperation and 
mutual benefit,” the paper lacks specific details on future project and relies on lofty 
rhetoric to promote the strategy.26 
                                                 
24 Elizabeth Economy, “The End of the ‘Peaceful Rise’?,” Foreign Policy, November 28, 2010, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/28/the-end-of-the-peaceful-rise/; Garver, “The Diplomacy of a Rising 
China in South Asia”; Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Roads to Influence.” Asian Survey 50, no. 4 (July/Aug 
2004). 
25 M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential 
for Territorial Expansion,” International Studies Review 12 (2010), 526; Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign 
Relations: Powers and Policy Since the Cold War, Kindle ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2012), 2. 
26 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road.” Issued by the People’s Republic of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, March 2015, 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. 
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In a study of Chinese media available on the Open Source Center, I found that 
Beijing maintains that China seeks a peaceful rise in economic growth and regional 
influence. According to a recent article in the Beijing newspaper, Caixin Wang, the “One 
Belt, One Road” strategy is China’s attempt to “promote regional economic cooperation” 
and “shoulder its responsibilities to the international economic system.” Arguing that 
developments in South Asia do not challenge U.S. actions in the Pacific, Chinese media 
heavily promotes a plan to “reform” the current international system, not “challenge” it.27 
Similar articles reporting on conversations with Chinese officials echo these statements and 
quotes leaders as stating that Beijing’s multilateral economic integration plans “bring about 
peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation between people and people, nation and 
nation.”28 In addition, officials believe that these programs promote peace and national 
security among the involved states. Without a hint of realist motivation, reports from China 
provide multiple examples of a desire for interdependence. In addition to the documents 
from the PRC, all of these resources will be addressed further in the Chapter II. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to create a framework that impartially assessed China’s motivations 
through both a realist and liberal lens, I selected four aspects of Belt and Road’s effect on 
South Asia to create four points of continuity throughout the thesis. The aspects were 
chosen in order to address the combined economic, geopolitical, and strategic effects of 
the OBOR initiative. They are: (1) the ability of Belt and Road to advance China’s 
national interests throughout the region, (2) bind China and its neighbors politically and 
economically, (3) create possible overseas bases, and (4) challenge current financial 
institutions and the regional order within South Asia. As a result, my research focused on 
addressing these four aspects, with a chapter devoted to each the realist and liberal 
argument, in order to build a case for each lens. 
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In the process, I examined previous, current, and proposed infrastructure projects 
and economic relationships between China and the following South Asian states: India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. These states were selected on their 
significance in the region, the presence of Chinese-led infrastructure projects within their 
borders, and/or evidence of economic relations between China and the state. After 
presenting a case for both lens under each of the four aspects, I considered the strength of 
each argument to assess Beijing’s motivations.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND FINDINGS 
The literature presents two potential explanations behind China’s motivations in 
South Asia. As discussed, each explanation is framed by a liberal or realist lens that seeks 
to predict if Beijing’s intentions are based on mutual economic development or a path to 
creating a sphere of influence around South Asia. 
Most liberals point to China’s desire to operate inside the current global 
institutions as evidence of a peaceful rise. Yet, realists argue that China’s peaceful rise is 
only temporary and its policy is far more aggressive below the surface. In addition, where 
liberal theorist point to China’s infrastructure programs as the reason for a rise in 
regional, economic partnerships, realist argue that China is creating opportunities for 
overseas basing and regional dominance throughout the Indian Ocean basin.  
My research found that China’s motivations are more consistent with a liberal 
interpretation in each of the four aspects. Belt and Road and similar projects have indeed 
created an environment that promotes win-win relationships, encourages involvement in 
multilateral institutions that mirror current regional institutions, and limits China’s ability 
to dictate regional policy. Furthermore, I found little evidence to support the notion that 
Beijing is attempting to develop overseas bases for military use. Overall, the realist 
argument appears to be too rooted in speculation that falsely links evidence to realist 
motivations. As a result, there is more evidence at this time to support a liberal view of 
China’s motivations behind the Belt and Road Initiative. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is separated into six chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter II 
provides background information on the OBOR strategy and documents China’s 
infrastructure development within South Asia over the past 15 years. In addition, I 
introduce the four aspects that make up the framework of the thesis. 
The Chapters III and IV assess these actions and attempt to explain Beijing’s 
motivations based on a realist and liberal interpretation. Each chapter will present the 
material under a separate school of thought, beginning with realism in Chapter III and 
liberalism in the fourth. I will provide a brief background on the school of thought before 
interpreting Beijing’s motives by utilizing the four-aspect framework. 
The Chapter V is my assessment of the material and interpretation of China’s 
motivation behind the OBOR strategy in South Asia. In the conclusion, Chapter VI, I 
summarize my findings and discuss the significance of these actions on South Asian 
relations and United States foreign policy while also addressing potential events that 
could alter my conclusion. 
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II. CHINA’S PATH TO BELT AND ROAD 
During a state visit to Pakistan in April 2015, Xi Jinping, President of the 
People’s Republic of China, wagered $46 billion on the geostrategic significance of 
Pakistan, and subsequently, South Asia. Believing the sub-continent to be the focal point 
of China’s recently announced One Belt One Road initiative, Xi proclaimed, “South Asia 
is where the land and maritime Silk Roads meet.”29 With Belt and Road taking center 
stage as China’s premier diplomatic strategy for the development of Asian economies, 
the gamble on the South Asian region marks the continuation of a unique relationship 
between the rising power and its neighbors to the southwest. Or as Xi proclaimed in front 
of the Parliament of Pakistan, “The initiative of building a Silk Road Economic Belt and 
a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road [the Belt and Road initiative] that China has launched 
is a significant move to fully open up itself under the new conditions. This initiative also 
reflects China’s commitment to sharing development opportunities and outcomes with 
more countries.”30 
Nevertheless, the announcement of China’s recent infrastructure investment is far 
from the initial step in China’s desire to connect itself with South Asia through an 
expansive system of transportation infrastructure. Since the first section of the Karakoram 
Highway (KKH) was cut through the mountain range of the same name, Beijing has 
sought to develop ports, roadways, and railways to integrate itself with the region. As 
was recognized in 1964, the year that marked the beginning of the KKH, these projects 
provide a vehicle to connect China both economically and politically with its neighbors.  
Today, the Belt and Road initiative is new evidence of an enhanced investment in 
a long legacy of Chinese-led projects throughout South Asia. Since 2000, Beijing has 
been laying the groundwork for a regional infrastructure program that is centered on 
connecting China to the South Asian subcontinent via Chinese-developed transportation 
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infrastructure. With Beijing utilizing South Asia as an economic hub to the world market, 
the recent Chinese-led infrastructure projects are opportunities for Beijing to promote 
economic corridors through trade and the movement of resources in and out of China. As 
a result, under Belt and Road, Beijing is ushering in the next phase in China’s economic 
opening and codifying all previous infrastructure programs within South Asia. 
This chapter conducts a review of significant Chinese-led infrastructure 
development in South Asia since 2000 and its connection to the recently announced Belt 
and Road initiative. After discussing previous projects and corresponding theories, the 
subsequent sections will review the progress and significance of Belt and Road and the 
economic institutions designed to support the program. In addition, I will discuss how 
these projects explain the spread of Sino-centric patterns, China’s new economic 
corridors, the “String of Pearls” theory, and the effects of these projects on the region. 
Finally, I will conclude by briefly summarizing Beijing’s possible motivations for this 
initiative under the lenses of both the realist and liberal schools of thought, which will be 
explored in greater detail in the following chapters. 
A. CHINA’S OBJECTIVES 
Before exploring the specifics of the previous infrastructure projects and the 
current Belt and Road initiative, first, I must discuss the broader significance of these 
ventures. In doing so, there are two questions to be explored: what are China’s needs and 
objectives in South Asia, and by investing in South Asian infrastructure, how is China 
benefiting? Beginning with the former, I will start by addressing two topics: Beijing’s 
stated intentions and Beijing’s economic needs.  
Since the PRC’s first attempt to pacify the fears of its Asian neighbors at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955, Beijing has consistently maintained a peaceful declaration 
to assist in the development of the global community. Referred to as the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence, this rhetoric promotes messages of equal growth, respect for 
sovereignty, and win-win cooperation. As recently seen in the opening paragraph of the 
Belt and Road statement, released on March 28, 2015, the paper connects the initiative to 
the spirit of the historic Silk Road’s “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, 
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mutual learning and mutual benefit.”31 Falling in line with previous public policy, this 
document again demonstrates how Beijing has taken great strides to promote an image to 
its Asian neighbors that Chinese assistance leads to Asian advancement. As will be 
demonstrated in subsequent sections of this chapter that discuss the significance of 
certain projects, the development of critical infrastructure has the ability to unite China to 
its neighbors through both economic ties and a show of good-will and support. 
Nevertheless, what China says and what China needs can present two starkly 
different interpretations. As the Chinese economy moves from a developing to developed 
state or production based market to a service based market, the process presents a need 
for Beijing to look outward. Where in the past, Chinese Gross Domestic Profit (GDP) has 
been anchored by the country’s exports, recent statements by public officials, including 
Chinese President Xi Jinping, indicate a desire to shift to a GDP supported by domestic 
consumption.32 To allow for this shift, which will result in a greater demand for outside 
goods and natural resources, Beijing is seeking opportunities to open additional routes to 
receive these goods and resources.  
In addition, the proposed infrastructure provides benefits to traditionally poor 
areas throughout China. With many of the proposed Belt and Road projects connecting 
China’s poor western regions to both China’s wealthy eastern coast and neighboring 
states, officials believe that the financial influx to the western provinces will alleviate the 
economic fall off.33 As a result, the connection between China’s east and west has the 
potential to provide economic balance across the state through the program’s ability to 
better distribute “China’s enormous industrial capacity” to its western regions and, 
subsequently, the markets of its southwestern neighbors.34  
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Second, the construction of ports along the Indian Ocean Basin and connecting 
transportation corridors across the Chinese border provide new lanes for China to 
continue diplomatic ties and trade relations with the Middle East and Gulf States.35 While 
research has found that maritime trade through the Strait of Malacca to China’s eastern 
seaboard is far more efficient and cost effective than overland transportation through the 
world’s highest mountain range, the benefit comes in the harbor capabilities available to 
Chinese merchant ships and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) that have begun 
venturing further from China’s shores.36 As will be discussed in a section on the 
significance of maritime infrastructure, this provides China an opportunity to maintain a 
significant maritime presence in a vital global sea route.37 
B. SOUTH ASIAN ROADS AND RAILWAYS: PAVING A PATH OUT OF 
CHINA 
In 1964, fourteen years after Pakistan became among one of the first states to 
recognize the PRC, the two governments set out to develop a highway through the 
Karakoram mountain range “for the explicit purpose of fostering trade and people-to-
people contact and the implicit purpose of enhancing both countries’ political and 
logistical control over their frontiers and capability to deal with external and internal 
security threats.”38 By 1978, the “Sino-Pakistani Friendship Highway” was complete and 
demonstrated the “close-to-literal realization of the claim that their friendship is ‘higher 
than the highest mountain.’”39  
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Commonly referred to today as the Karakoram Highway, the mountaintop road 
connects western China to Pakistan’s highway and railway system. When construction 
was set to resume on the roadway in 2001 after 23 years, the KKH-rebuild was planned 
to be the centerpiece of a new China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connecting western 
China to the Indian Ocean via an expansive system of road and railways through 
Pakistan.40 With additional plans announced in 2006 to resurface and widen the highway, 
progress has been stalled since 2010 due to a massive landslide that submerged a 14-mile 
section under a resulting lake.41 
Unfortunately, Mother Nature has not been the only set back. As mentioned, the 
KKH was slated to become the centerpiece of the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC) connecting the Chinese-constructed port in Gwadar, Pakistan with China’s 
western-most province, Xinjiang. Yet, since the opening of the port in 2006, construction 
on connecting roads and railways between the port and the KKH has stalled over security 
concerns stemming from actions against the Pakistani government by Baluch nationals 
that see the projects as an opportunity for the Pakistani military to control the region.42 
Nevertheless, Xi’s recent support of the construction demonstrates China’s desire to bring 
the vision to fruition.  
In addition to developments in Pakistan, South Asia has seen new or proposed 
Chinese-led construction in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and across the Tibet 
Autonomous Region with over 140 roads connecting China to its Asian neighbors.43 
Beginning in Myanmar, China’s 1999 “Western Development” domestic strategy, 
designed to encourage economic and social growth in the lagging central and western 
parts of the country, has prompted Beijing to develop transportation infrastructure 
connecting these regions with China’s eastern coast and neighboring countries.44 As a 
result, the strategy has prompted significant development in China’s Yunnan Province, 
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which operates as a hub between Myanmar ports to the south and businesses centered in 
China’s east. Referred to as the Yunnan International Passage, this project alone is 
responsible for over 840 miles of new roadway between the two states from 1999–2012.45 
Yet, not all projects between the Asian neighbors have been a success. Despite significant 
infrastructure crisscrossing the Irrawaddy Corridor and linking economic centers in both 
Myanmar and Burma with Yunnan, public opposition has stalled future projects. With 
funding allocated in 2011 for a new railway between Kunming in China and Kyaukpyu,46 
the project was cancelled in 2014 due to public protests over natural resource extraction 
by China that was believe to represent Beijing exploiting the Myanmar government.47  
Shifting to China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, there are similar examples of road 
and railways linking neighboring states to China’s underdeveloped western provinces. 
Beginning in 2001, construction began on the first major rail system to connect China 
and the Tibetan city of Lhasa. Opening in 2006, the railway creates the possibility for 
future projects in geographically challenging sections of Nepal, Bhutan, and northeastern 
India.48 While these projects might seem more like tales of science fiction due to the 
engineering challenges associated with going over the roof of the world, China is not 
easily dismayed. Announced in the 2008, Beijing stated intentions to extend the Lhasa 
railway to the Nepal border at Zhangmu. A year later, the provincial government of Tibet 
had widened the already adjacent highway at a cost of US$100 million, with intentions to 
construct a second track to central Nepal.49 In addition, if that was not enough to 
demonstrate the seriousness behind China’s intentions, recent reports from Chinese state 
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media claim that Beijing is preparing to tunnel under Mount Everest to connect 
Kathmandu to the Lhasa railway by 2020.50 
C. SOUTH ASIAN PORTS: CHINA’S NEW GATEWAY TO THE WORLD 
The terminuses of these roads and railways are the port cities of South Asia. As 
previously discussed, China seeks to provide opportunities for economic growth 
throughout its western hinterlands. These port cities are gateways to the Middle East, 
Africa, and Europe by providing maritime transportations hubs that link back to the 
mainland. As a result, China continues to finance similar transportation infrastructure 
projects in the form of ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. 
Gwadar, situated on Pakistan’s Arabian Gulf coast, lies at the end of the KKH’s 
adjoining roadway system and provides China with a strategic advantage due to its 
proximity to the Strait of Hormuz.51 Originally envisioned as a solution to reduce the 
high traffic into the port of Karachi, the Chinese took interest in the project in 2001 after 
pledging to fund $198 million of the initial $248 million construction costs through the 
China Harbor and Engineering Corporation that has supervised construction. Completed 
in 2006, the port officially opened in 2007 under the operation of the Port of Singapore 
Authority (PSA).52  
By 2008, the port had suffered setbacks as a second phase of construction stalled 
over legal disputes between the Pakistani Government, Pakistani Navy, and PSA. In the 
end, the Singaporeans vacated the contract and port operations were assumed by the 
China Overseas Port Holdings Company in 2013.53 As China reassumes control of the 
port, its recent $46 billion investment to the connecting roads, railways, and pipelines that 
will stem from the port signify the significance Beijing sees in the project, which reports 
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indicate, “China hopes to transform into a free-trade zone on the order of a Singapore or a 
Hong Kong.”54 
Recognizing the opportunities from maintaining access to maritime hubs around 
the Indian Ocean Basin, China has financed additional projects in Hambantota, Sri 
Lanka; Chittagong, Bangladesh; and Kyaukpyu, Myanmar. For example, with a loan of 
85% of the $361 million first phase and 100% of the $808 million second phase, a state-
owned Chinese bank covered a significant portion of the cost to complete the 
Hambantota port, and as a result, gained operating rights to four berths upon 
completion.55 A similar occurrence in 2010 saw China agreeing to fund the $9 billion of 
the estimated cost to build the Chittagong deep-water port, situated in the Bay of 
Bengal.56 Coupled with the road and railway systems that connect many of these ports 
back to China, these projects diversify the economic routes into the country by 
incorporating additional shipping lanes that avoid significant bottle necks, such as highly 
trafficked international shipping lane through the Strait of Malacca. 
D. BELT AND ROAD: MULTIPLE PROJECTS MERGE 
While Beijing has been laying the building blocks for a grand-scale regional 
infrastructure initiative since the first slab of concrete was laid for the KKH, the push 
since 2000 marks the start of a significant attempt by Beijing to advance the project based 
on a need to redefine China’s economy and develop new economic opportunities. 
Nevertheless, throughout the past decade and a half, only individual projects have dotted 
an agenda that lacked a clear and focused vision to unite the economic gateways 
connecting China to the world. The formal introduction of OBOR in March 2015 
attempts to change this fact by unifying the past and future infrastructure programs under 
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a single strategy. The project joins two previous initiatives, first announced in 2013, the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. 
The first indication of Beijing’s new intentions became public in the fall of 2013 
when President Xi conducted a state visit to Kazakhstan. While speaking at Nazarbayev 
University on September 9, 2013, the Chinese President discussed the importance of 
economic ties between China and its Central Asian neighbors and the need to encourage 
trade through the development of transportation channels in the region. The speech was 
the first mention of the Silk Road Economic Belt concept.57  
One month later during another state visit, this time to Indonesia, the second half 
of the Belt and Road was announced. Speaking in front of the Indonesian Parliament on 
the importance of maintaining a strong relationship between China and the ASEAN 
states, Xi pledged to strengthen maritime ties to China’s Southeast Asian neighbors 
through the promotion of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Designed as a vehicle to 
expand “practical cooperation with ASEAN countries,” Xi proclaimed that the program 
succeeds by “supplying each other’s needs and complementing each other’s strengths, 
with a view to jointly seizing opportunities and meeting challenges for the benefit of 
common development and prosperity.”58 
With the maritime and land initiatives announced, the program continued to 
quickly progress throughout late 2013 and into the following year. By November 2013, 
the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP “called for 
accelerating the interconnection of infrastructure among neighboring countries, and 
facilitating the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road.”59 The following March, government work reports out of the 
Chinese Premier’s office echoed the call by the Third Plenary Session for acceleration 
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and stirred discussion on the status of the CPEC and a second economic corridor linking 
Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar, part of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM).60 
In addition to plans for infrastructure development and political unity, the 
accumulation of capital through two new financial establishments, the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF), signaled real 
momentum. Launched in October 2014 and initially backed by 21 Asian states, the AIIB 
membership has grown to 57 countries, as of June 1, 2015, and is attempting to fund the 
$750 million annual infrastructure gap that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is 
unable to overcome.61 With China becoming an economic cornerstone in the Asian 
market, some argue that institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank must retool its leadership positions to allow for increased Chinese 
influence. Nevertheless, with the changes in these systems slow to occur, the rise of the 
AIIB demonstrates a possible Chinese solution to the similar lack of leadership issues 
that weighs on other developing states.62 
Set up in November 2014, the SRF is designed to utilize domestic and 
international capital to finance Belt and Road projects and “seek out investment 
opportunities during the development of the ‘One Belt and One Road.’” Officially 
announced at the 2014 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing, 
President Xi pledged $40 billion as the initial investment.63 Coupled with the AIIB, 
support of these institutions demonstrates a willingness by the international community to 
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back China’s plan for economic unification and to fix a sub-standard infrastructure 
system in an economically vital region of the world. 
In March of 2015, nineteen months after President Xi introduced the initial 
concepts, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce released a joint paper formally outlining the 
principles of the Belt and Road initiative. Titled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building 
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” the paper begins by 
discussing the background, principles, and framework of the program before detailing the 
priorities, mechanisms, and regions of interest. Relying heavily on previous Chinese 
foreign policy concerning mutual respect and mutual benefits, the program seeks to build 
a “new Eurasian Land Bridge” that utilizes industrial parks in participating states as 
“cooperation platforms.”64 In addition, at sea, it utilizes “secure and efficient transport 
routes connecting major sea ports” to develop economic interconnectedness.65  
While the paper makes clear that the success of this program will be judged on the 
ability to create the infrastructure necessary for the free-flow of trade and technology, the 
primary message is the promotion of common development, fiscal integration, and 
upholding China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In addition to discussions on 
infrastructure development and key principles of Chinese foreign policy, as Scott 
Kennedy and David Parker explain, “the plan is also notable for its mixing of tradition 
Chinese diplomatic language (e.g., emphasizing sovereignty and nonintervention) 
alongside a newer rhetorical focus on adherence to high standard and international norms 
and ‘decisive’ role of the market and industry in driving the initiative.”66 
From both a domestic and foreign policy view, this initiative is a strong step 
forward for China. Domestically, China seeks to utilize Belt and Road to promote 
economic growth throughout its historically lagging western provinces. As it states in the 
section regarding the opening of these regions, “We should make good use of Xinjiang’s 
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geographic advantage and its role as a window of westward opening-up to deepen 
communication and cooperation with Central, South and West Asian countries, make it a 
key transportation, trade, logistics, culture, science, and education center, and a core area 
on the Silk Road Economic Belt.”67 Internationally, the program is an opportunity for 
China to shoulder additional responsibilities as a rising global power and improve its 
image in the eyes of South Asia and other great powers: “China is committed to 
shouldering more responsibilities and obligations within its capabilities and making 
greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind.”68 
E. FOUR ASPECTS OF BELT AND ROAD’S SIGNIFICANCE TO SOUTH 
ASIA 
Shifting the focus back to South Asia, the Belt and Road initiative promises to 
have significant ramifications on the economy and the geostrategic importance of the 
region. As a result, there are four likely aspects that will influence not only China’s 
relationship with the South Asian states, but also the dynamics among each other and the 
global powers. It is these four aspects that I will utilize to assess China’s motivations and 
act as four points of continuity throughout the thesis. 
First, infrastructure advances China’s national interest throughout the region.69 
Not only does the investment in transportation infrastructure provide new free-market 
opportunities for Chinese business, new economic corridors create “Sino-centric patterns 
of trade, investment, and infrastructure” within the economic institutions in South Asia.70 
As John Garver argues, “While it may be true that China is inspired by purely economic 
and developmental objectives, this is beside the point, Chinese influence will flow along 
these new transportation lines, regardless of why they were built.”71 Essentially, as 
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already demonstrated from completed projects, these programs produce significant 
economic ties and illustrate the magnitude and growing reach of China’s economy.72  
Second, infrastructure ties China politically and economically to its neighbors, 
and them to China. In addition to the spread of “Sino-centric patterns,” a key result, and 
one being heavily pursued by Beijing, is the development of economic corridors, 
specifically the CPEC and the BCIM. In Pakistan, public officials have shown strong 
support by accepting Chinese funding and capital. The sticking point is security concerns 
over protests and threats by regional Pakistani actors. As a result, Beijing is becoming 
entrenched in local Pakistani politics, as Chinese workers are targets of Baluch and 
Taliban fighters.73  
Meanwhile, the BCIM is caught in a great power struggle between China and 
India. As Chinese influence flows along new transportation lines, the global significance 
rests on the effects the expansion will have on the Sino-Indian, Indian-American, and 
Sino-American relationships. For New Delhi, recent Chinese expansion is seen as a 
challenge to India’s sphere of influence.74 In addition, with India promoting its new Look 
East strategy that seeks to increase Indian influence in East Asia, China might soon find 
itself in a similar position.75 Nevertheless, continued economic ties between the two 
nations will prove beneficial, as any confrontation between the two will only stunt the 
growth of both states. As M. Taylor Fravel argues, the challenge for India and China is to 
“manage these contentious issues so that they do not prevent the deepening of the 
cooperation that China seeks.”76 
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Third, maritime infrastructure presents the possibility for overseas basing. 
Commonly referred to as the “String of Pearls” theory, analysts have argued over the 
likelihood of Chinese-developed ports being utilized as naval bases by a growing 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). With China constructing a network of 
commercial ports along the Indian Ocean basin, the strategic location of these facilities 
present a threat to India or any other potential or established power in the region.77 As a 
result, the capabilities of these ports present a concern to all states with interests in the 
IOR. To date, the evidence does not support this theory, but the possibility alone still 
raises tensions.78 
Finally, infrastructure and its associated financial institutions challenge current 
institutions and the regional order within South Asia. The AIIB and SRF were designed 
by Beijing to be the financial arm of Belt and Road.79 Believing that the IMF and World 
Bank are failing to recognize growing changes in the global order, an issue that will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, China is searching for opportunities 
to reinvigorate the process these institutions created.80 As a result, issues arise over a 
perceived intent and ability for these institutions to challenge western-led institutions 
already closely tied to the region. 
F. CONCLUSION: DEBATING BEIJING’S MOTIVATIONS 
Today, China recognizes its significance in the global economy and its ability to 
affect change regionally, and more likely, globally. By investing in an infrastructure gap 
that has previously hindered Asia’s ability to reach its economic potential, Beijing is 
investing in its own regional significance. Yet, China also understands that it must walk a 
fine line as it stresses a desire to avoid the appearance of a revisionist state seeking to 
drag South Asia into an economic sphere of influence.  
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From a liberal lens, China’s motivations do not appear to drive a revisionist 
agenda. As iterated in the Belt and Road vision, China continues to promote a win-win 
objective with no desire to attain hegemonic status. With its actions supporting the public 
policy, China has yet to exclude any state from admittance into either of the supporting 
financial institutions or from partnering to develop infrastructure supportive of the Belt 
and Road mission. In many cases, China has even financially supported projects in the 
name of progress, without any assistance from the host nation.81 
Additionally, China continues to operate within the norms of the international 
system. As demonstrated by the creation of the AIIB, China seeks to conduct business by 
developing financial institution in similar fashion to western institutions such as the Asia 
Development Bank, IMF, and World Bank. As Thomas Moore explains, “China’s pursuit 
of institutionalized cooperation signifies a growing commitment to a rules-based, norm-
driven international order.” Thus, China is seeking to develop a system “based more on 
rules than power.”82 If this is true, indicators will show a lack of Chinese intimidation 
toward other states as Beijing gains economic power, and as the relationships mature, 
they will still be viewed as win-win. 
From a realist perspective, China’s actions are an attempt to replace the 
international order with its own system of institutions centered on Chinese leadership. 
Recognizing the steps that led to U.S. hegemony, Beijing is manipulating the current 
system to affect change in its favor. Similar to a military strategy known as “Phase Zero 
Operations” in which peacetime actions create strategic opportunities, these projects 
present opportunities that China can keep dormant until its sees a need to capitalize.83 As 
a result, China’s actions can represent a push to develop a sphere of influence through 
“economic statecraft.”84 
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Whether viewed through a realist or liberal lens, the Belt and Road initiative is the 
next evolution in a multiple-decade attempt to expand the China’s economic 
opportunities throughout Asia, specifically South Asia. As President Xi has stated, South 
Asia is, and will continue to be, the focal point of both the Maritime Silk Road and the 
Silk Road Economic Belt. The outcome of his wager will rest squarely on how the PRC 
decides to play its hand, and how that is perceived by the global community. 
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III. A CASE FOR REALIST MOTIVATIONS 
There is no denying the large Chinese footprint that Belt and Road leaves on 
South Asia. Through the development of significant infrastructure that dots the IOR and 
the creation economic corridors leading in an out of China, the PRC’s influence grows 
with each project. And while Beijing might claim the most peaceful of intentions, fears of 
a realist agenda have created real concern among leading players in South Asia, primarily 
India and the United States. 
This cautious nature comes from an underlying suspicion of China’s motivations 
behind such a large-scale project. Fearing the initiative is an effort by China to 
undermine, counterbalance, or even encircle India, New Delhi points to the strategic 
location of each project and recruitment of economic allies in India’s backyard as 
evidence of potential friction between the two states.85 In a recent visit to China, Indian 
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, spoke about the need for “bilateral cooperation” in a 
“shared neighborhood.” And while his speech held the same uplifting and promising 
liberal tone of China’s Belt and Road guiding principles, Modi was sure to downplay 
expectations of the complete Indian support of Chinese projects in South Asia by failing 
to highlight China’s Belt and Road efforts: “Equally, we both seek to connect a 
fragmented Asia. There are projects we will pursue individually. There are a few such as 
the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor that we are doing jointly.”86  
Similar to the fears of Indian strategists, realist scholars argue that these 
projects— both those associated with Belt and Road and those preceding the initiative— 
advance a Sino-centric agenda and create a dependent relationship between China and 
South Asia, with China holding the strategic advantage. These arguments come through 
observations of the lack of economic benefits seen since the resurgence of Chinese-
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developed infrastructure in the region since 2000, the strategic location of planned and 
completed projects, and the development of multilateral development banks that appear 
to challenge the current order. While China’s motivations may not be as nefarious as 
these proposed effects may appear, there is reason to believe that Beijing is not operating 
from the progressive and liberal nature its rhetoric proclaims. 
After reviewing the details of the Belt and Road initiative and related projects 
preceding its announcement, this chapter will present evidence and arguments that show 
realist motivations behind China’s actions in South Asia. First discussing the realist 
school of thought and its connection to Chinese foreign policy in South Asia, following 
sections will detail realist scholars’ assessments of the four aspects of Belt and Road, first 
addressed in the Chapter II. Evidence of revisionist motivations must demonstrate 
aspirations of establishing a regional hegemony that seeks to advance a Sino-centric 
agenda and draws South Asia into an economic and political sphere of influence. This 
includes utilizing infrastructure to advance Chinese economic and military needs, 
creating market dependencies for weaker littoral states on the robust Chinese markets, 
developing overseas bases from strategically located maritime ports, and funding new 
multilateral development banks that challenge western-led institutions. I will conclude by 
reviewing the evidence and attempting to incorporate it with the realist theories. 
A. DEFINING REALISM 
When discussing a state’s foreign policy through a realist lens, it is necessary to 
focus on the school’s inherent belief that all states take actions that are primarily in the 
best interest of the state. Believing that the world is comprised of an international system 
of anarchy, realism argues that the system is fueled by the “enduring propensity for 
conflict between states.”87 While this does not necessarily denote a sinister nature in 
which all states seek out conflict, there is an expectation that states’ motivations, 
especially great powers, prioritize survival, and often, growth. This prioritization of a 
state’s interest can be magnified through resource scarcity, geopolitical strategy, or 
economic ambitions. In summarizing the tenets of realism, Jason J. Blazevic states, “The 
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importance of such aspects is magnified by geography and access to resources, which 
further complicate international relations. Indeed, nations are competitive actors pursuing 
their key national interests: national security and survival.”88 
From this point, realism can be divided into offensive and defensive tenets. 
Defensive realism argues that states act in a manner focused on protecting their own 
security. When threatened, a state will seek economic, military, or diplomatic action to 
ensure survival.89 Offensive realism predicts that when states have the ability, they will 
seek to gain influence and maximize power.90 Realist scholar John J. Mearsheimer paints 
the bleakest theory of international politics in arguing that, “the mightiest states attempt 
to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power 
dominates another region.”91 Thus, if broken down, realism provides opportunities to 
explain both power seeking and security seeking motivations. With this difference in 
mind, there are two specific concepts that provide either an offensive or a defensive tint 
to a realist lens. 
First introduced by General Charles F. Ward, USA, in 2006, the concept of Phase 
Zero Operations describes military actions designed to shape a battlefield prior to initial 
hostilities. Defined as encompassing “everything that can be done to prevent conflicts 
from developing in the first place,” the goal is to “invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis 
situation to avoid and exponentially larger expenditure later.”92 For scholars fearful of 
China’s ambitions, Phase Zero operations assist in explaining China’s motivations behind 
strategically located ports and economic partnerships with geostrategic littoral states. In 
line with an offensive realist approach in explaining China’s actions, this theory of Phase 
Zero tactics advances a theory in which China is utilizing programs such as Belt and 
Road to create strategic military and economic advantages that have the potential to be 
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used for future military engagements. Proposed by three senior U.S. military officers in 
the Naval War College Review, the officers utilized the Phase Zero concept to address 
what they describe as a Chinese strategic culture set on disrupting the status quo: “in sum, 
China’s strategic culture encourages intervening subtly in a situation long before armed 
conflict arrives to alter the strategic landscape…by laying the groundwork in Phase Zero, 
the strategic landscape can be altered so that objectives of the state can be achieved, and 
with minimal fighting.”93 Essentially, those in favor of the theory depict China’s actions 
as an overt attempt at altering the IOR in China’s favor.  
From a more defensive mindset, China’s actions can be depicted as simply 
economically opportunistic. Thus, while Belt and Road might provide economic benefits 
for the South Asian community, the motivation for the PRC is to create an environment 
that caters to China’s needs and eliminates competition. If depicted in a hegemonic 
nature, Jonathan Holslag argues that Chinese infrastructure is an example of “road 
diplomacy,” the creation of economic advantages that advance Chinese interests: 
“Hegemonic powers champion economic openness and make major contributions to the 
development of common goods because they expect that their superior economy will 
allow them to accumulate wealth faster than others. Hegemony is a cost-effective 
alternative to imperialism.”94 Therefore, under this theory, China’s motivations are not to 
conduct Phase Zero operations, but instead, Beijing seeks to create a sphere of influence 
where economic control creates a Chinese hegemony throughout South Asia to ensure 
Chinese survival. 
B. BELT AND ROAD’S SIGNIFICANCE: A REALIST ARGUMENT 
Since the resurgence of Chinese-led infrastructure in 2000, and increasingly since 
the introduction of Belt and Road in 2015, realist scholars believe that OBOR will 
blanket South Asia with economic corridors designed to advance a Sino-centric agenda 
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and create figuratively, if not literally, a scenario in which all roads lead back to China.95 
When assessed in the framework of the four aspects of Belt and Road previously 
addressed, realist scholars argue that there is sufficient evidence to prove that these 
aspects will soon be recognized as effects of Beijing’s grand strategy. First, infrastructure 
advances China’s national interests throughout the region. Second, infrastructure ties 
China politically and economically to its neighbors by creating dependencies on China’s 
economy and diplomatic policy. Third, maritime infrastructure is strategically located to 
allow for future overseas bases. Fourth, Belt and Road infrastructure and supporting 
economic institutions seek to challenge the U.S.-dominated status quo in the IOR. The 
following sections will review each aspect individually in order to best assess the 
evidence and challenge it against liberal theories in the following chapters. 
1. Infrastructure Advances Only China’s Interests  
China’s growing interest in South Asia is a reaction to the state’s increasing need 
for natural resources, and as a result, control of the Sea Lines of Communications 
(SLOCs) cutting through the India Ocean region (IOR).96 Since 2009, China has been a 
net importer of oil, natural gas, and coal, with demand expected to rise by 60% between 
2010 and 2035.97 This rapid expansion of Chinese demand is forcing the PRC to 
prioritize the supply lines connecting resources in the Middle East and Africa to 
economic centers on China’s eastern coast. Thus, since 2000, China’s interest in South 
Asia has centered on securing access in, out, and through this geostrategic body of 
water.98  
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Becoming a part of the Chinese lexicon in 2003, the “Malacca Dilemma” states 
that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy 
route of China.” Fearing a closure of the strait would cripple China’s energy import 
market, the PRC has been seeking additional avenues to avoid such a crisis.99 This in turn 
places greater significance for China on its ability to find new options to move resources 
out of the IOR, even if that means over land. Coupled with the creation of massive 
petroleum reserves in both its eastern and western provinces, there is greater reason to 
believe that China sees these infrastructure projects as Chinese resource highways 
designed to store, transfer, and secure natural resources, and not South Asian main streets 
designed to support local growth.100 Yet, signs of practical, strategic actions by a state do 
not demonstrate realist motivations. Instead, evidence of infrastructure believed to 
advance solely Chinese interests must also prove that these relationships are exploiting 
the partnering countries’ economies. 
Nevertheless, effects of the Karakorum Highway in Pakistan and maritime 
facilities in Sri Lanka seem to demonstrate evidence at both the local and state level. 
Despite predictions that these projects would produce a win-win environment, evidence is 
showing that these small markets, affected by Belt and Road and proceeding projects, are 
being negatively affected. Beginning with Pakistan, reports from the Gilgit-Baltistan 
territory, the last stop on the KKH before the road crosses into China, claim that the 
project has failed to enhance the local economy and raise the residents’ living conditions.  
In a study for the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, Senge 
Sering reported that “the per capita per annum income of Gilgit-Baltistan is only one-
fourth of Pakistan’s national average and more than 1.3 million of its inhabitants still live 
below the poverty line…likewise, the energy consumption rate is almost ten time 
lower…compared to Pakistan’s national per capita average.”101 While there is reason to 
argue that local economic failures falls on Islamabad’s shoulder and not the Chinese, the 
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lack of growth is not just at the local level. The report goes on to claim, “When Sino-Pak 
trade reached the $7 billion mark in 2009, the share of trade via KKH was miniscule 4 
per cent [sic].”102 
In Sri Lanka, the case is much the same. Since the end of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s 
presidency in January of 2015, Sri Lankan policy has a seen a shift away from the pro-
China Colombo Consensus that marked the previous ten years and more toward a 
Western-allied approach.103 Initially, the alignment with China began as the result of 
policy differences with the United States and India over the government’s handling of the 
Sri Lankan Civil War. When the two states failed to support the island state, China 
stepped in, in part due to its policy not to involve itself in a business partner’s domestic 
affairs, including reports of human rights violations and war crimes.104 Nevertheless, the 
ten-year period saw significant development on the island as China sought to make Sri 
Lanka the “crown jewel” of China’s maritime Silk Road.105 
The recent shift away from China is the result of a new administration seeking to 
unburden itself of Chinese influence. With a debt of between six to eight billion U.S. 
dollars to China for infrastructure projects, newly elected Sri Lankan President, 
Maithripala Sirisena, has publicly downplayed the possibility of future Belt and Road 
projects on Sri Lankan soil.106 Seeking “to tackle corruption and nepotism and create a 
more balanced foreign policy,” the President is listening to public scrutiny concerning 
over past projects and is driving the country toward closer relations with India and the 
United States.107 
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While China’s actions appear to address realistic, strategic concerns, there is also 
evidence that these projects have been unable to produce positive results in its partnering 
states. In order for Beijing to right this effect, there must be future evidence that local 
economies are benefiting from infrastructure in its own backyard. This will include job 
growth, benefits to the local service industries, and lower long-term debts between China 
and its South Asian partners. 
2. Infrastructure Provides Avenues of Influence for China 
In addition to being avenues for importing critical resources back to China, Belt 
and Road projects are providing the PRC with opportunities to create a strong economic 
and political footprint throughout South Asia. Liberal scholars argue that the increase of 
Chinese involvement in South Asian multilateral institutions is an example of China self-
regulating this influence, an issue addressed in the following chapter. Yet, realist scholars 
believe that regardless of the intended purpose or the limits China places on its actions, 
the newly developed infrastructure, and subsequent corridors, act as a funnel for Chinese 
influence flowing straight from Beijing.108 In addition, there is a great fear by India that 
China’s influence in South Asia will encroach on its own sphere of influence.109  
For example, before the infrastructure resurgence in 2000 began, India oversaw a 
South Asia that, with the exception of Pakistan, had very few states showing interest in 
pursuing relations with China or countering Indian interests. The result at the time was a 
large gap between New Delhi and Beijing’s political and economic influence in 
neighboring South Asian capitals. Yet, after over a decade of infrastructure development, 
China surpassed India in trade relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma, and as 
one scholar points out, since the turn of the century, “Beijing successfully cracked the 
artificial, Monroe Doctrine-like wall India once hoped to construct around the 
subcontinent and now enjoys cordial ties and booming economic relations with nearly all 
the region’s capitals.”110 
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The obvious result of this market shift is the creation of stronger ties between 
Beijing and its South Asian neighbors. And while this might seem to be a logical effect 
from the rise in economic opportunities and partnerships that Belt and Road brings, the 
threatening aspect is the potential for China to begin utilizing its new influence to dictate 
South Asian policy or pressure states that fail to conform to the Belt and Road principles. 
According to the Center for American Progress, “The Belt and Road initiative is heavily 
invested in countries that have both a strong government relationship with China and 
hold popular support for Chinese investment.”111 Realist point to this rise in political 
influence in Belt and Road projects as a change from the traditional noninterference 
approach Beijing has maintained on past business engagements.112 
Additionally, some argue that this political influence will translate into Chinese 
support for countries willing to confront India’s regional influence. In the case of 
Pakistan, Indian scholars argue that Beijing’s growing relationship with Islamabad, 
apparent in the recent $46 billion infrastructure package, affords Pakistan the opportunity 
to operate under a Chinese security blanket and threaten India without fear of 
repercussions.113 And as one Indian scholar argues, “The relationship with Pakistan has 
enabled Beijing to pursue and India strategy on the cheap, while maintaining its own 
focus on other areas of more immediate interest.”114 As a result, India is left with little 
choice but to seek bilateral opportunities with China while attempting to dampen the 
geopolitical effects Belt and Road has on the region.115 
As these projects progress, evidence of realist motivations will show Beijing 
supporting projects in states publicly outspoken against India. If other states adopt 
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policies similar to Pakistan after benefitting from the program, there is reason to believe 
that Beijing is utilizing Belt and Road to, at a minimum, gain political influence, and at 
worst, create a sphere of influence designed to challenge India directly. 
3. Maritime Infrastructure Equals Overseas Basing 
Since its conception by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton in 2004, the term 
“String of Pearls” has generated significant debate over the feasibility, or even likelihood, 
of China’s desire to repurpose South Asian maritime infrastructure as overseas military 
basing for an expanding PLAN. While China publicly claims these ports are intended for 
commercial use and overseas basing represents an unacceptable violation of sovereignty, 
realists argue that the strategic positioning of these facilities is designed to expand 
China’s sphere of influence and encircle India.116 Former Indian Foreign Secretary, 
Kanwal Sibal, best summarized India’s speculations by arguing, “There is a method in 
the madness in terms of where they are locating their ports…this kind of effort is aimed 
at counterbalancing and undermining India’s natural influence in these areas.”117 
Clearly, a significant aspect of Belt and Road is the development of maritime 
infrastructure connecting China with South Asia’s warm water seaports. With the PRC 
seeking to secure safe passage from the Strait of Hormuz through the Strait of Malacca, 
Figure 1 depicts how the strategic locations of these bases act as Chinese checkpoints 
dotting the IOR. Essentially, each base represents potential facilities, allowing for 
replenishment and refit opportunities as Chinese shipping and PLAN forces transit and 
patrol the Indian Ocean. In addition, they provide secondary routes back to China, 
alleviating the Malacca Dilemma. 
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Figure 1.  Chinese “Pearls” 
 
Source: Prem Mahadevan, “China in the Indian Ocean: Part of a Larger PLAN,” CSS 
Analyses, no. 156 (2014). 
Analysts supporting of the string of pearls theory often point to the teachings of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a staple of U.S. Naval doctrine and U.S. maritime diplomacy, to 
argue that China is electing to follow a similar strategy by mimicking the philosophy that 
created the U.S. maritime hegemony. As security analyst Virginia Marantidou explains 
by referencing Mahan’s famous Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783: 
Forward bases, which enjoy a good geographical position are fortified and 
enjoy the advantage of resources, are invaluable to the operation of 
warships. Accordingly, these bases should be strategically placed along 
the sea lines of communication to give control of the high seas against an 
enemy or other potential threat….According to Mahan’s argument, the 
Chinese will build a blue-water navy and establish naval bases which will 
give them the opportunity to project power and protect China’s economic 
and national interests.118 
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From an offensive realist perspective, China’s actions can be viewed as a strategic 
move to create opportunities similar to a phase zero operation. Coupled with the 
advancements of the connecting road and railways, such as the widening and expansion 
of the KKH to increases vehicle capacity, these projects are perceived to afford China 
new options to stage troops and resources for future military conflicts in the region.119 
The defensive realist perspective is less menacing and sees China’s actions as the 
development of a logistics network that dots the IOR, slowly, yet deliberately, revising 
the maritime environment in a Mahanian manner.120 
Those that argue against the “String of Pearl” theory are quick to point to the 
limited capacity of these facilities, the diplomatic costs of reversing public policy on state 
sovereignty, and the financial risk of investing significant capital to convert each port into 
a fully functional naval base. Essentially, these bases provide the PLAN with only a 
minimal advantage and do little to reverse the current geopolitical status quo when 
compared to the established maritime power and logistical infrastructure of the U.S. Navy 
and its allies.121 In addition, analysts argue that it would be foolish for China to station 
high-value assets of a developing navy within striking range of India’s missiles without 
the full support of the Chinese fleet.122 
Therefore, outside of the strategic location of each port, there currently is little 
evidence to prove the “String of Pearls” theory. Nevertheless, as Belt and Road 
progresses, evidence of a realization of this theory will be dependent on PLAN’s activity 
in and around new maritime infrastructure. Should these ports begin housing PLAN 
assets, this will be a clear sign that Beijing is failing to uphold its Belt and Road promise. 
Additional evidence will be an increase of PLAN forces in the region and naval exercises 
designed to demonstrate a show of force that challenges India or the United States. 
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4. Challenging International and Regional Institutions 
As addressed in the previous chapter, the funding for China’s expansive 
infrastructure network is funneled through two new financial institutions, the AIIB and 
the SRF. Initially seeking only to modernize the current institutions in order to represent 
the changing global economy better, a failed attempt at ratification in the U.S. Congress 
forced China to move away from the Bretton Woods system. Not wanting to engage in 
over $600 billion of bilateral loans, Beijing followed a multilateral approach and founded 
the AIIB.123 Since its founding in October 2014, membership has grown to 57 countries, 
as of June 1, 2015, and the organization places China center stage in the effort to find a 
multilateral solution to overcome a $750 million annual infrastructure gap, an issue the 
Japan and U.S.-led ADB has been unable to resolve.124  
For realist scholars, the fear is that the founding of these institutions is a 
deliberate attempt by Beijing to challenge the Bretton Woods system, establish a new 
regional and global order centered on China, and advance the strategic interests of the 
Belt and Road initiative through selective funding.125 In addition to the lack of 
transparency, a central concern when comparing the AIIB to the current system is the 
division of voting shares. For example, where China held a 5.48% voting power in the 
ADB and mere 4% in the IMF, in the AIIB, Beijing’s vote carries 26.06%. This in 
comparison to Washington’s leading vote share of 12.75% in the ADB and 17.68% in the 
IMF.126 As a result, the significant increase in voting power could allow China to dictate 
the use of funds and the selection of projects. 
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To date, the United States has opted not to join this new Multilateral Development 
Bank (MDB) over fears that the bank does meet the “high standards” set by western-led 
international institutions. Fearing that these banks lack the required transparency needed 
to be effective and beneficial to Asian markets, of which South Asia is set to be a prime 
candidate, President Obama addressed the topic in a joint press conference with the 
Japanese Prime Minister in April 2015: 
What we have said [regarding the AIIB] and what we said to all the other 
countries involved is exactly what Prime Minister Abe said, which is, if 
we’re going to have a multilateral lending institution, then you have to 
have some guidelines by which it’s going to operate. That’s how the 
World Bank operates. That’s how the IMF operates. There may be 
weighted votes in terms of who’s the biggest contributor, but you’ve got to 
have some transparency in terms of how the thing is going to operate—
because if not, a number of things can happen. Number one, money could 
end up flowing that is misused, or it doesn’t have high accounting 
standards, and we don’t know what happens to money that is going into 
projects…And if, in fact, the Asia Infrastructure Bank that is being set up 
ends up having those kinds of safeguards, is run in a way that ultimately is 
actually going to lead to good infrastructure and benefit the borrowing 
countries, then we’re all for it…But if it’s not run well, then it could be a 
negative thing. And what we don’t want to do is just be participating in 
something and providing cover for an institution that does not end up 
doing right by its people. Because when these countries borrow money, 
even from a development bank, for a boondoggle project that doesn’t 
work, they’re oftentimes still on the hook for paying that money back.127 
Those in favor of the bank claim these statements by the United States are 
hypocritical because of previous criticisms against China for failing to shoulder the 
responsibilities of a major power. Instead, proponents argue that the AIIB does indeed 
demonstrate a leadership attempt by China and deserves U.S. support.128 In addition, the 
fact that the AIIB is a multilateral institution in which China does not hold a majority 
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share of the vote, demonstrates restraint by Beijing. Through this process, China is 
accepting limits on its own influence.129 
Nevertheless, realists continue to believe that this attempt to revise the system of 
multinational development banks is representative of Beijing’s desire to diminish 
Washington’s role in the developing world, specifically South Asia and the Indian Ocean, 
by creating a power play at the United States’ expense.130 As Asia security analyst Jeff 
Smith describes, “China is now operating beyond the reach of a U.S. veto, capable of 
reshaping the international order unilaterally. The AIIB will grant China a virtuous cycle 
of benefits, expanding its political and economic leverage across Asia, and aiding its 
efforts to elevate the yuan as an international reserve currency.”131 If successful, that 
could mean greater influence and the ability for China impart a more nationalist 
trajectory within its strategy in South Asia.132 
Regardless of realist speculation, to date, there is not enough conclusive evidence 
to assess China’s motivations behind AIIB. However, what to watch for are the same 
indicators that the President addressed: funds that are utilized to support projects based 
on the needs of the region, examples of transparency and high standards in all 
transactions, and affordable interest rates that do not cripple a state’s economy. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I presented evidence supporting a realist assessment of China’s 
motivations behind the Belt and Road initiative, specific to South Asia. The chapter 
began with a brief discussion on the offensive and defensive theories within realism and 
utilized these theories to depict motivations behind China actions. Second, I presented 
evidence favoring a realist interpretation of the four aspects of the Belt and Road 
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initiative: first, a primary objective of Chinese-built infrastructure is to provide safe and 
secure avenues for natural resources back to China; second, the newly developed 
infrastructure, and subsequent corridors, act as a funnel for Chinese influence flowing 
straight from Beijing; third, the strategic positioning of these facilities is designed to 
expand China’s sphere of influence and encircle India; and fourth, the start of Chinese-
led multinational development banks in support of the Belt and Road initiative is a 
deliberate attempt by Beijing to challenge the Bretton Woods system and advance the 
strategic interests of Belt and Road through selective funding.  
Each of these arguments indeed demonstrates aspects of the realist school of 
thought by making the case that China has engaged in behavior that is self-serving, 
questions win-win intentions, appears strategically shrewd, and challenges international 
norms. Only time will tell if China’s motivations are part of strategy for South Asia that 
is not win-win, but instead a win for China. The next chapter will provide evidence of 
liberal motivations before assessing both arguments and drawing conclusions on the 
projected outcome of OBOR, the influence it will have on South Asia, and the best 
course of action for the United States. 
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IV. A CASE FOR LIBERAL MOTIVATIONS 
In 2011, The PRC’s Information Office of the State Council published the 
Peaceful Development White Paper that expressed China’s intent on peaceful 
development throughout the state’s “advance toward modernization.” The paper opens by 
stating, “At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century and on the occasion of 
the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC), China 
declared solemnly again to the world that peaceful development is a strategic choice 
made by China to realize modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and make 
more contribution to the progress of human civilization. China will unswervingly follow 
the path of peaceful development.”133 Coming a decade after the Chinese economic and 
infrastructure resurgence in South Asia and two years before the announcement of the 
Belt and Road initiative, the document exemplifies China’s publicly stated strategic goals 
to build a multilateral system that encourages economic unity, cooperation and common 
development, and a win-win environment. 
Similar to the Belt and Road announcement in 2015, this public declaration of 
peaceful development is the product of both Chinese culture and the evolution of an idea 
that began with China’s opening in 1978, found a voice within the CCP at the start of the 
21st Century, and is reaffirmed under the current Chinese leadership that is seeking to 
expand on the miracle growth of the past decade.134 When viewed in concert with the 
promotion of infrastructure development throughout South Asia, China’s efforts to 
publicly express a peaceful doctrine demonstrate a unity of the liberal motivations by the 
Chinese government and its actions demonstrated since 2000. Supporters of China’s 
efforts and stated intentions argue that Belt and Road is the manifestation of China’s 
promotion of peaceful development and creates the all-inclusive, win-win environment 
that is keen on assisting other developing states, specifically those that have been 
overlooked by India or the West. Nevertheless, a liberal motivation cannot be solely 
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judged on stated intentions and contentious projects along the Belt and Road map. 
Instead, evidence of these intentions must display actions that demonstrate multilateral 
economic and political growth throughout the region, a lack of Chinese military influence 
and pressure, and a respect by the PRC for the international institutions and norms that 
govern globalization. 
This chapter will review explanations of China’s Belt and Road initiative in South 
Asia that favor liberal motivations. Beginning with a brief discussion on liberalism that 
will highlight three aspects I will utilize to construct the framework for the liberal 
argument, the following section will present a liberal assessment of the four aspects of 
Belt and Road discussed in the Chapter II. As stated above, this evidence must display 
actions that demonstrate multilateral growth, a lack of potential for overseas basing (i.e., 
a rejection of the “String of Pearls” theory), and an acceptance of the global norms and 
institutions that have defined the global community since WWII. I will conclude by 
reviewing the evidence presented and incorporate it with the liberal theories addressed in 
the first section. 
A. DEFINING LIBERALISM 
Before addressing the liberal motivations, it is important to revisit the primary 
themes that define liberalism, specifically in relation to Chinese foreign policy. As 
discussed in the introduction, liberalism offers theories that explain the growing 
interdependence of states through economic exchange, global institutions, and societal 
norms. Through this interdependence, states are influenced by such factors and, as a 
result, bound to a certain course of action. As Andrew Moravcsik explains, the central 
idea behind liberalism is that “the relationship between states and the surrounding 
domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state 
behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences.”135 As a result, 
where realism argues that states seek to operate solely in their best interest, liberalism 
believes that the norms and institutions that direct the global community shape a state’s 
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international strategy. For the purpose of this chapter, there are three aspects of the liberal 
school of thought that must be highlighted to construct the framework needed to properly 
assess Beijing’s motivations. 
First, interdependency places binding constraints on a state’s behavior. In defining 
the core assumptions of liberalism, Moravcsik points out that “liberal theory assumes that 
the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state 
behavior.”136 This idea that interdependency binds China to the interests of its 
community, specifically the South Asian community, is a central point in explaining 
China’s motivation to promote a win-win environment. As I will explore in subsequent 
sections, China’s infrastructure diplomacy in South Asia is forging deep relationships 
between Beijing and its neighbors. These relationships develop into an interdependent 
South Asian community that promotes unified goals dictated by the binding constraints of 
the situation. As a result, China’s motivations continue to develop within the framework 
of the community’s interests and norms. As the evidence is assessed, it will be important 
to judge the strength of China’s bond with South Asia, both in word and action, to better 
predict future events. This will be done in the following sections by seeking evidence of 
Chinese economic and political restraint that ensures both partners are prosperous 
monetarily and politically and satisfied with the terms of the relationship. 
Second, the demonstration of a state’s commitment to the international 
community is displayed by its desire to seek out and engage international governmental 
organizations. In order to predict the strength of the community’s bond, and if such a 
community is capable of driving China down a path of peaceful development, Justin S. 
Hempson-Jones argues that there must be evidence of state participation in international 
governmental organizations (IGOs) that limit Chinese behavior. Believing that China has 
demonstrated such evidence in other aspects of its foreign policy, he explains that “while 
the PRC has benefited enormously from the majority of its IGO memberships, it has also 
become costly for China to breach the norms or defect from the rules and obligations it 
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has agreed to observe.”137 In South Asia, an example of this behavior is the creation of 
the AIIB that both supports the Belt and Road program and, as will be displayed, limits 
China’s ability to dictate a course of action. Under this argument, the evidence favoring 
liberal motivations must demonstrate a restraint on Chinese behavior, but at the same 
time, does not need to represent a fiscal or political loss. 
Third, the development of new leadership within the global community does not 
constitute a completely revisionist agenda. According to John Ikenberry, the international 
order is not threatened by changes within the global community that diminishes the 
prominence of western powers and expands the influence of developing states: “The 
struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles of the liberal 
international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.”138 
Essentially, a changing of the guard does not constitute a changing of the system. 
Therefore, this theory will assist in assessing the motivations behind the development of 
new institutions that are potentially designed to challenge the authority of similar 
western-led institutions. And like the other two, this theory will be assessed on the 
evidence’s ability to demonstrate China’s desire to utilize the new institutions to give a 
voice to other developing states and engage issues that western-led institutions have 
failed to address. 
B. BELT AND ROAD’S SIGNIFICANCE: A LIBERAL ARGUMENT 
In Chapter II, I addressed four aspects of China’s infrastructure diplomacy 
throughout South Asia. First, infrastructure advances China’s national interest throughout 
the region. Second, infrastructure ties China and its neighbors politically and 
economically. Third, maritime infrastructure presents a possibility for overseas basing. 
Fourth, the financial institutions designed to support Belt and Road challenges the norms, 
spheres of influences, and financial institutions that govern the South Asian community 
and its connections to the West. While it is too soon to evaluate the level of influence that 
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these projects will have on the region, evidence from the projects completed over the past 
decade and the trends observed since the announcement of OBOR allow for a strong 
assessment of the motivations behind China’s grand strategy.  
Utilizing these four aspects, the following sections argue: Chinese infrastructure 
promotes a win-win environment throughout South Asia; infrastructure and its supporting 
institutions creates binding commitments between China and other South Asian states; 
there is minimal evidence to support theories of overseas basing; and Belt and Road 
infrastructure and supporting economic institutions do not challenge the current system. 
1. What Is Good for China Is Good for South Asia 
To China, it is all about economics. After three decades of 10% growth, the 
Chinese market is in danger of resource scarcity, industrial overcapacity, and failing to 
find sufficient options to utilize over US$3.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.139 In 
Beijing, the first step in correcting the mounting economic frustrations is rebalancing the 
domestic economic disparity between the states lucrative eastern cities and its landlocked 
western regions. Utilizing a domestic strategy of western development to correct the 
economic imbalance, China views Belt and Road as a grand strategy to link China by first 
connecting it with the world: “By connecting China to countries along OBOR, it will help 
develop an economic space that will create a new frontier not just for China’s western 
regions, but for the country as a whole. For China, this new frontier will surely attract 
investments and labor from the east, with the western region becoming the bridge 
between China and the countries linked to OBOR.”140 And for China’s western regions, 
the first viable international markets are in neighboring South Asia. 
Nevertheless, where realists see this as a self-driven effort to increase Chinese 
gains by creating economic dependencies on an overbearing Chinese economy, both 
historical and recent evidence present a different view of China’s motivations. Beginning 
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with the historical perspective, a common belief in China argues that the hierarchical 
design of the international system requires great powers to develop and support smaller 
states. Specifically for those states neighboring China, interstate behavior must be 
marked by “mutual respect, deference, and responsibility.”141 Evidence of China’s self-
imposed burden of assisting other developing countries is seen simply in its desire to 
bring other states into the Belt and Road initiative, even if it means “free-riding” on 
China’s dime.142 Such examples have been seen already by Chinese banks funding 
significant ports in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in order to open bottlenecks created by a 
lack of infrastructure.143 Recently, President Xi has carried this message of connectivity 
and “free-riding” throughout South Asia by first arguing that “diplomatic work with 
neighboring countries is out of the need to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation,” which in turn will build an environment that benefits from “common prosperity” 
and connectivity between China and South Asia.144  
To date, this common prosperity is displayed in the form of economic assistance, 
trade relations, and of course, infrastructure development. For example, since 2003, 
Chinese exports to its South Asian neighbors, specifically Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka, have doubled, with over a quarter of Bangladesh’s imports arriving from 
China. This has resulted in a rise in trade between China and the region of US$45 billion 
from 2006–2011. In addition, bilateral investment has grown by $500 million, to a total 
of $2.8 billion, between 2005 and 2010.145 With this growth occurring during the period 
of pre-OBOR construction, there is reason to believe that increased connectivity will 
result in greater economic growth. As such, Beijing sees a path of continued, common 
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economic prosperity as the number of infrastructure projects increase under the banner of 
the Belt and Road initiative.  
In addition, infrastructure represents not only economic gain for the region, but 
also potential for regional stability. Using Pakistan as a case study, the $46 billion 
invested by China to complete modernization projects on Gwadar port is the best hope at 
turning a dangerous and lawless region into a bustling center of economic growth.146 By 
producing new jobs and modern facilities in the region, China is following a model 
similar to the United States strategy throughout the cold war—economic growth breeds 
stability.147 As a result, the billions of dollars that have since been invested in South 
Asian infrastructure since 2000 and the billions more promised in OBOR packages 
represent opportunities for continued growth throughout South Asia. 
Therefore, while expansion into South Asian markets through the development of 
infrastructure clearly advances China’s national interest, in return there is evidence to 
show that the effects have been mutually beneficial for many of China’s neighbors. As 
concluded in a recent report prepared by the University of Wisconsin for the U.S. 
Government Office of South Asian Policy, “these increases create opportunities for 
growth and development as a wider variety of exports flow from China into the region, 
and as Chinese outward direct investment improves infrastructure and creates jobs.”148 
As such, future evidence of win-win environment must demonstrate continued increased 
trade between China and South Asian states and sustained South Asian GDP growth that 
is comparable to China’s growth. If so, the evidence will drive further support of 
Beijing’s actions and continued evidence of liberal motivations. 
2. Infrastructure: A Tie That Binds 
There is no denying the power struggle in South Asia between China and India. 
Since fighting a border war in 1962, their relationship remains a point of contention 
within the region. And as trade relations between China and South Asia rises to include 
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an increase in trade between China and India, New Delhi is left fearing an unwelcomed 
Chinese arrival in what it once believed to be a sphere of influence exclusive to India.149 
Nevertheless, Belt and Road provides potential to repair a tense relationship through the 
implementation of economic corridors and the possible admittance of China into South 
Asian institutions such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). Through the openness and inviting nature of Belt and Road and subsequent 
institutions, China is showing a willingness to engage all players in South Asia. 
Concerning the economic corridors, infrastructure projects prior to Belt and Road 
marked the beginning of economic avenues now known as the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Cooperation 
(BCIM). Previously discussed in Chapter II, these programs provide dedicated, binding 
institutions that unite key players to China and China to them. The BCIM, for example, 
focuses on “result-oriented and project-based cooperation, all aimed at bringing tangible 
benefits to the people in the region” and is committed to linking policy, roadways, trade, 
and currency among the four participating states.150 Drawing on the same lessons of Belt 
and Road, the organization is seeking to develop infrastructure that links Kunming to 
Kolkata and Mandalay to Myanmar.151 
Nevertheless, India still maintains reservations over Belt and Road, specifically 
on the implementation process and, more importantly, the security implications of an 
increased Chinese naval presence in the IOR.152 Seeing Belt and Road as Beijing’s 
attempt to revise international order in South Asia and undermine growing U.S.-India 
security relations through encirclement tactics, India continues to stall progress not only 
in BCIM, but also in China’s admittance into SAARC.153 
                                                 
149 Harsh V. Pant, “India and China slugging It Out in South Asia,” Japan Times, December 21, 2014, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/12/21/commentary/world-commentary/india-china-slugging-
south-asia/. 
150 Rahman Jahangir, “The Potential of BCIM Economic Corridor,” Financial Express, April 02, 
2014, http://old.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2014/04/02/26527. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Geethanjali Nataraj, “Why India Should Join China’s New Maritime Silk Road,” Diplomat, July 
03, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/why-india-should-join-chinas-new-maritime-silk-road/. 
153 Ibid. 
 53
Formed in 1985, SAARC members include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, and Afghanistan. Yet, while China retains only observer 
status, the involvement of numerous SAARC voting members in Belt and Road projects 
has advanced the call from partnering states, primarily Pakistan, to issue full member 
rights to China.154 Therefore, with SAARC struggling to produce substantial economic 
growth, even after the signing of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement in 2006, India 
can do little to stop smaller SAARC members from being enticed by China’s promises of 
$30 billion worth of investment in regional infrastructure.155 
In Beijing, leaders understand that in order for Belt and Road to succeed in 
India’s backyard, it is necessary to find common ground with the South Asian giant. In a 
recent op-ed in China Daily, the author addressed the need for China to develop stable 
relations with key players in regions significant to the Belt and Road initiative: “As an 
emerging power that faces competition and even efforts at containment by existing 
powers, China has reached a stage where it needs to adopt an innovative diplomatic 
strategy…it should forge partnership with strategic pivot states…which can withstand 
international pressure to large extent.” In South Asia, India represents this pivot point, 
assuming China can find a way to address New Delhi’s concerns and maintain a balance 
between the historical rivalry between India and Pakistan.156 
The first step will be finding common ground to advance both China’s Belt and 
Road with India’s own Act East policy, which aims to create, to a lesser degree, similar 
infrastructure and economic advancement in Southeast Asia.157 If both states act in 
accordance with the promises of cooperation and mutual respect that each initiative 
promotes, there is opportunity to create significant economic growth and continued 
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cooperation. In addition, the inclusive nature of Belt and Road affords India the 
opportunity to promote regional cooperation and retain its role as a leader in the IOR. As 
an Indian columnist argued, “Indian investment in neighboring littoral countries could 
help in reducing China’s sphere of influence and dominance in South Asia to some 
extent.”158 
Therefore, the promotion of infrastructure in South Asia certainly provides 
opportunities to create cooperation and economic growth, if pursued in a truly equal 
manner. Success for these projects will be defined through the evolution of inclusive 
organizations such as BCIM and SAARC that allow equal voices to all participants and 
advances the win-win diplomacy that they promise. 
3. Maritime Infrastructure Does Not Equal Overseas Basing 
On May 5, 2015, in response to concerns associated with the release of China’s 
most recent national military strategy, a spokesperson for the PRC Defense Ministry 
stated “[China] has not built any military bases overseas.” Citing a defense policy solely 
focused on national defense, he clarified China’s military strategy as one that “seeks no 
hegemony or military expansion.”159 While this has not been the first time the PRC was 
forced to defend its proclaimed peaceful motivations behind the Chinese-led construction 
of port facilities along key supply routes in the IOR and other significant bodies of water, 
the “String of Pearls” theory argues the opposite. Centered around the Mahanian-esque 
belief that the militarization of the ports along Maritime Silk Road is in progress and 
necessary to support a growing maritime presence, the theory remains a pillar of the 
realist explanation to Beijing’s motivations behind Belt and Road. Fueled primarily by 
speculation that ignores trends and current evidence, the theory relies on the belief that 
simply because it has not developed overseas bases, does not mean China will not 
develop them in the future.160  
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Instead, opponents of the “String of Pearls” theory argue that there is a lack of 
substantial evidence proving that the recently constructed maritime facilities, specifically 
those discussed in previous chapters, are intended for PLAN use.161 In addition, recent 
theorists add that a plan to utilize these ports for combat-oriented purposes would be a 
strategic mistake for China.162 Drawn from evidence of diplomatic, financial, and 
military complications, arguments against the theory pose three significant points: the 
diplomatic difficulties to secure buy-in from South Asian host nations is significant, 
China is unlikely to place high-value assets in such a strategically vulnerable location, 
and the ports in their current condition lack the features necessary to be utilized as power-
projection points for the PLAN, both now and in the future.163 
First, outside of annexing a foreign harbor, the development of a PLAN base in 
any South Asian state requires China to gain approval from the host nation. Due to the 
geographical advantages, these smaller states hold in the current “Indo-Pacific Great 
Game,” it is unlikely that they will surrender this diplomatic bargaining chip to allow 
China to place warships in their sovereign waters. As one scholar argued, “Whatever 
sweeteners China might offer, it’s hard to imagine that any South Asian regime would 
jeopardize this geopolitical flexibility for a PLAN pied-a-terre and political blessing from 
Beijing.” Instead, it is more likely that these strategically significant states utilize their 
unique geostrategic advantage to play the competing interests of India, the United States, 
and China against each other for their own economic gain.164  
Second, a significant naval buildup in the IOR provides little strategic advantage 
to China and jeopardizes its overall naval security. With over 75% of its oil imports 
coming from Africa and West Asia, the focus of naval assets assigned to the region is the 
protection of resources along the maritime silk road.165 Understanding that threat to these 
resources is primarily small scale pirate attacks, it is unwise for China to utilize 
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significant portions of its Navy in a location that is unsupported and within striking range 
of Indian air and missile threats. In addition, a larger, offensive force in the IOR draws 
from China’s coastal, homeland defenses and counters its image of a “peaceful rise.”166 
Finally, in a study out of the National Defense University in 2014, researchers 
assessed the physical components of each “pearl” against the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) and Department of Transportation standards for military port facilities capable of 
supporting combat operations. They found that all but one port fell short of the standards 
that the U.S. DOD “considers minimally acceptable to support major combat 
operations.”167 Therefore, unless China intends to invest significant resources toward 
increasing the port capabilities, it is unlikely that these ports are used for means outside 
of China’s stated intentions. 
Nevertheless, while there might be sufficient evidence to disprove the likelihood 
of China utilizing these facilities for offensive combat operations, it does not detract from 
the fact that there is strategic value in the OBOR port facilities. For example, even if 
China continues to use these ports strictly as replenishing facilities, increased ports will 
likely result in a significant rise in Chinese shipping, which in turn will require greater 
naval presence in the IOR to ensure the protection of SLOCs and Chinese nationals 
working overseas. As a result, this rise in PLAN ships will dictate greater port visits and 
increased diplomatic relations between China and the littoral states.  
With it being normatively accepted that warship port calls are a form of 
diplomacy, a tactic utilized by great powers like the U.S. and United Kingdom, OBOR 
marks an opportunity for China to advance its Belt and Road goals through the increase 
in naval presence and economic opportunities that come from port visits and ship 
replenishments.168 As the realist argument points out, this could lead to economic 
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coercion, or as one author argued, “making economic investment a potential weapon.”169 
Therefore, in order for China to demonstrate a liberal motive as a required naval presence 
expands in the IOR, future evidence must demonstrate no indication of economic or 
political pressure by Beijing on smaller, littoral states. Indications of this pressure would 
include refusing or revoking future Belt and Road projects in an effort to coerce a smaller 
state into relinquishing sovereignty or agreeing to disadvantageous economic terms. 
4. Changing of the Guard, Not a Changing of the System 
For over 70 years, the Bretton Wood System has steered the global financial 
market through a period of stable and peaceful economic growth. Producing institutions 
such as the World Bank and IMF, this agreement dictated the norms and terms for global 
financing and international loans that spurred multinational growth in the post-WWII era. 
Nevertheless, liberal scholars argue that due to a lack of maintenance by the U.S. and 
European leaders in recent years, these institutions have failed to mature and accurately 
reflect the growing role of developing Asian states, primarily China.170 Recognizing the 
inability of the IMF and World Bank to adapt to a changing world, China has since 
sought to reinvigorate the process by founding two new institutions, the Asian 
Infrastructure Bank and the New Silk Road Fund, both offspring of the Belt and Road 
initiative and designed to be the financial muscle behind it.171 While realists see this as 
Beijing’s attempt to undermine “the U.S.-led economic order” and advance a Chinese 
agenda, liberal scholars argue that the institutions are an effort by Beijing to fix a broken 
system and give the developing world a greater voice.172 
In Beijing, the call for new economic institutions took root in 2010 after the U.S. 
Congress failed to ratify reforms to the IMF that would have provided developing states 
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greater voting shares in the system.173 These reforms sought to move 6% of the voting 
shares from developed states to developing states, thus increasing the voting share for 
102 of the IMF’s 187 members. In addition, it is important to note that the IMF classifies 
all South Asian states as developing economies.174 Yet, with the United States, the 
leading IMF shareholder, failing to ratify the changes, the developing states are left with 
what they perceive as a dated system.175 
Believing that waiting on the United States is not the appropriate answer for the 
global community, Beijing has utilized the lessons learned from over a decade of 
infrastructure development to create its own institutions that advance the promises of Belt 
and Road, equality and win-win economics. Therefore, with 57 members as of 2015, the 
AIIB appears to be an accepted solution to the current system.176 Despite criticisms from 
realist scholars, those supporting the AIIB point to three pieces of evidence that 
demonstrate a liberal agenda: the AIIB does not change the system, only modernizes it; 
as an international institution, the AIIB binds China to a cooperative agreement; and 
economic interdependence has the potential to lessen future conflicts between great 
powers and emerging markets.177 
First, the central criticism that China has with the current institutions is the lack of 
voting shares held by developing countries, to include India and itself. Recognizing that 
the world has continued to evolve in the 70 years since the signing of Bretton Woods, 
China argues that changes that incorporate “systemically important countries” into these 
multinational institutions is imperative to better engage current issues.178 Despite 
emerging market economies accounting for “more than half of the global GDP on the 
basis of purchasing power,” these states still only hold a 40–60 split of the IMF’s vote 
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when compared to advanced countries.179 In addition, loans provided by the World Bank 
and IMF are subject to conditions set by developed states that emerging states have found 
fail to provide emerging markets with strong long-term economic policies.180 As a result, 
China sees the AIIB, like Belt and Road, as a vehicle to replicate its recent economic 
success by addressing the needs of South, Central, and Southeast Asian states.181 
Despite China’s desire to modify the system, evidence of its intent to maintain the 
international order is displayed in the structure of the AIIB. As a Japanese editorial 
stated, “we should be pleased the Chinese have opened up such an institution in the 
traditional mold. At a time when the world is wondering what to make of the rise of 
China, the adoption of a traditional approach suggests they are intent on being a member 
of the current global order rather than challenging the status quo.”182 Essentially, China 
recognizes that its own growth is the result of the current economic order and it seeks to 
“actively reform the current system” instead of attempting to replace it.183  
Second, by creating a system in which Beijing has bound itself to a vote 
composed of equal percentage across the founding members, a group that includes all 
South Asian states with the exception of Afghanistan and Bhutan, China is voluntarily 
limiting its capabilities.184 These limitations, a tactic the United States used after WWII 
to assuage fears of perceived attempts at economic control, make it inherently difficult 
for Beijing to manipulate Belt and Road projects.185 
Third, as China continues to rise to great power status, some scholars fear that it 
will fall, along with the United States, into the Thucydides Trap. The AIIB, and Belt and 
Road as the overarching initiative, creates an opportunity for each state to openly assess 
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the other’s actions, policy, and intent in a geographically significant region.186 In 
addition, Philip Y. Lipscy argues that AIIB can be seen as a “marker of status and 
prestige” for China. Like previous great powers that have founded a multilateral 
development bank, “the influence and prestige of contemporary international institutions 
give countries a new avenue through which to gently contest the contours of the world 
order.” Essentially, this newfound “prestige” is believed to lessen an emerging state’s 
desire to contest global norms with military force because they already feel that it no 
longer needs to fight for a seat at the table.187 
In the future, determining factors regarding China’s motivations will be Beijing’s 
ability to remain bound to the principles of a multilateral development bank and avoid 
opportunities to drive infrastructure projects that promote Chinese gains. Evidence of this 
will be found in the selection of Belt and Road Projects that provide on occasion the 
greatest benefits to the host nations and other South Asian states, such as supporting 
infrastructure that addresses needs not specific to China. If China is found to be driving a 
Sino-centric policy that either hinders host nation GDP growth or is unsupportive of trade 
not involving China, this will negate Beijing’s promise of win-win diplomacy.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I presented evidence supporting a liberal assessment of China’s 
motivations behind the Belt and Road initiative, specific to South Asia. That argument 
was centered around three aspects of the liberal school of thought: interdependency binds 
China to the interests of its community, the demonstration of a state’s commitment to the 
international community is displayed by its desire to seek out and engage international 
governmental organizations, and the development of new leadership within the global 
community does not constitute a revisionist agenda. Under this framework, I addressed 
the four aspects of the Belt and Road, which reoccur throughout this thesis, with evidence 
supporting liberal motivations: first, while development of Chinese-produced 
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infrastructure in South Asia is in China’s best interest, there is evidence that it is also in 
South Asia’s best interest; second, infrastructure development binds China to South Asia 
and demonstrates a commitment by China to the betterment of South Asia; third, there is 
minimal evidence supporting the String of Pearls theory; and fourth, the start of Chinese-
led multinational development banks in support of the Belt and Road initiative do not 
demonstrate a desire by Beijing to challenge the current system.  
Each of these arguments indeed demonstrates aspects of the liberal school of 
thought by proving that China has engaged in interdependent behavior, sought out and 
formed international government organizations, and requested new leadership under the 
current system. While time will tell if China is able to deliver on its ambitious plan, there 
is significant evidence to believe that China holds a progressive ideal over revisionist 
desires. After now presenting both the realist and liberal explanation of China’s 
motivation, the next chapters will assess both arguments and draw conclusions on the 
projected outcome of this project, the influence it will have on South Asia, and the best 
course of action for the United States. 
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V. ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS 
To this point, I have attempted to provide evidence to answer the question, “are 
China’s motivations for infrastructure development in South Asia more consistent with a 
realist or liberal lens.” The question was first addressed in Chapter II by conducting an 
objective review of Chinese-led infrastructure projects in South Asia from 2000 to the 
introduction of Belt and Road in 2015. Chapters III and IV then presented evidence by 
both realist and liberal scholars and media sources that addressed the four reoccurring 
aspects of these projects under their respective lens. These four aspects were selected 
because each presented a question that, in answering, addressed a portion of the central 
question surrounding China’s motivations. In order to properly build a case in favor of a 
liberal or realist lens, I felt it necessary to dissect the overall question into these specific 
topics. To review one last time, those aspects are: infrastructure advances China’s 
national interests throughout the region; infrastructure ties China politically and 
economically to its neighbors, and China to them; maritime infrastructure presents the 
possibility for overseas basing; and infrastructure and its associated financial institutions 
challenges current institutions and the regional order within South Asia. 
After assessing the evidence, I found that in each of the four aspects, the liberal 
lens presented stronger evidence to explain China’s motivation. In this chapter, I explain 
the reasons that brought me to this conclusion and how I assessed the evidence. In 
keeping with the same format, this will be done by addressing each aspect individually 
before providing an overall conclusion.  
A. DOES INFRASTRUCTURE ONLY ADVANCE CHINA’S NATIONAL 
INTERESTS? 
With this first aspect, I looked to answer the question, is this infrastructure 
advancing only China’s interest or are there clear economic benefits for all of South 
Asia? I found that the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as previous infrastructure projects, 
are creating a win-win environment and providing economic opportunities for those 
countries that partner with China. 
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Due to the promises of “common development” and “win-win cooperation” that 
Beijing posed as the central theme of the Belt and Road initiative, the liberal argument 
carries the burden of proof to demonstrate evidence of economic advancement in 
partnering countries.188 It supports the idea “what’s good for China is good for South 
Asia,” with clear evidence showing that there has been a significant rise in trade and 
bilateral investment over the past decade, such as the $45 billion in trade and $2.3 billion 
in bilateral investment that has occurred since the beginning of these infrastructure 
projects.189 In addition, China’s investment in areas such as the volatile Baloch region of 
Pakistan, does demonstrate a desire to combat instability with economic growth.190 
Nevertheless, as countries like Sri Lanka continue to fall further into debt with 
Chinese banks, already between six to eight billion U.S. dollars, there is reason to argue 
against common development.191 Furthermore, realists point to the lack of growth at the 
local level as signs that the initiative is not developing South Asia from top to bottom. 
Instead, they push the narrative that Belt and Road is simply an initiative to provide 
China with avenues to compensate for its “Malacca Dilemma.”192 
So are there clear benefits for South Asia? Yes, the evidence that I found showed 
that these infrastructure projects are in fact creating trade and investment opportunities 
throughout South Asia. By China acting on a need to transport greater quantities of 
resources throughout the region, Beijing is creating market opportunities for those willing 
to partner with Chinese firms. The realist argument falls short when it suggests that China 
is responsible if these states fail to manage their debt level or properly distribute 
dividends down to the local level. For example, it is not Beijing’s responsibility to ensure 
the benefits of the CPEC are aiding the 1.3 billion inhabitants of Pakistan’s Gilgit-
Baltistan territory that live below the poverty line.193  
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Yet, there is one specific indicator that must be observed as the projects move 
forward. The economic benefits to the host states will diminish if infrastructure continues 
to come under the operating control of Chinese firms. If the events at Gwadar, in which 
the China Overseas Port Holdings Company assumed control in 2013, become a trend, 
there will be reason to doubt China’s intentions to provide a win-win environment as jobs 
move away from local residents and to imported Chinese nationals.194 
B. HOW INFLUENTIAL DOES BELT AND ROAD MAKE CHINA IN 
SOUTH ASIA? 
Through the development of Chinese infrastructure, it is clear to both sides that 
China will have a greater influence in South Asian affairs. Thus, the question becomes 
does China’s involvement in South Asia create cooperation opportunities through 
multilateral economic corridors or pathways for Chinese influence to spread throughout 
the region and dictate South Asian politics? Due to the inclusive nature of China’s 
efforts, I found the liberal evidence best explained China’s motivations. 
From a liberal perspective, infrastructure has created economic corridors that are 
trending toward greater involvement by China in previously established multilateral 
institutions. Noting the potential for China to move from observer status to full member 
rights in SAARC, liberals argue that this demonstrates willingness on the part of China to 
embrace a local multilateral institution and bind itself to decisions concerned with the 
region’s greater good.195 
Realist scholars counter this notion of the binding power of regional institutions 
and economic corridors by arguing that Belt and Road favors only those countries that 
maintain popular support for China.196 This implies that states involved in Belt and Road 
will remain loyal to Beijing, and Beijing can use these relationships to further its own 
agenda—of which will be encroaching on India’s sphere of influence.197 One example is 
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China’s recent investment in Pakistan. By showing such outward support, in the form of a 
$48 billion infrastructure package, China is empowering India’s greatest rival.198 
Nevertheless, I failed to find strong evidence that could connect the construction 
of infrastructure with requests by Beijing for retributions from the host state. While it 
might be naive to think that there would be overt evidence of such a connection, any 
indication of China raising such suspicions during its selection process is rejected by the 
fact that China has a retained a strong inclusive nature about its programs. It has 
maintained a public policy to accept all states into Belt and Road and its multilateral 
institutions, to include India. Indeed, there is clearly economic competition between the 
two rivals, but this does not equate to China attempting to empower states that oppose 
India. As a result, there is greater evidence to support the idea that China’s increased 
involvement in regional politics shows a general concern for the direction of the region, 
due in part to its own economic needs. Additionally, there is less evidence showing a 
desire by Beijing to encroach on India’s sphere of influence. 
C. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE PORTS? 
At the center of the debate over China’s motivations lies the “String of Pearls” 
theory. As previously addressed, this theory proposes that Beijing is funding strategically 
located ports on the Indian Ocean basin in order to encircle India, dominate the IOR, and 
expand China’s sphere of influence.
199 Believing that there is a method to the madness, 
Indian scholars have made claims that China’s actions are designed for the sole purpose 
of counterbalancing India.
200
 Offensive realists push the limits of the theory further by 
claiming that China’s actions are consistent with phase zero operations, designed to 
create options to move troops and resources for future military action.
201
 Overall, I found 
little evidence to support this theory and felt it to be based primarily on conjectures about 
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what might occur. As a result, liberal scholars provide a stronger argument by presenting 
evidence that directly contradicts realist speculations. 
In refuting this theory, there are two specific pieces of evidence that best 
articulate the liberal argument. First, a research team at the National Defense University 
proved that all but one “pearl” was incapable of supporting major combat operations.
202
 
And second, there is little strategic advantage for China to draw forces away from its 
established coastal defenses in order to patrol the IOR.
203
 As a result, I found that most 
liberals agree that, “China’s ‘pearls’ appear to be what Beijing says they are: 
conventional shipping facilities designed to connect China’s landlocked western 
provinces to maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean.”204 Dissenters of the theory 
believe that, at best, the facilities will be classified as a “Dual Use Logistics Facility” to 
support “non-traditional security challenges” such as counter-piracy operations, natural 
disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance.205  
In my research, I was hard pressed to find any substantial evidence to prove 
realist motivations. Instead, it appears more likely that China is simply developing well-
placed replenishment stations for its growing shipping demands in the region. In addition, 
there is significant merit to the argument that placing a large-scale naval force in the IOR 
would be a strategic mistake. It contradicts Beijing’s claims of a “peaceful rise” and 
detracts from its objectives in the South China Sea.206 Thus, while it is too soon to pass 
judgment on the theory, the evidence in favor of it remains skeptical at best. 
D. IS CHINA CHALLENGING THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER? 
The fourth aspect addressed the financial institutions associated with Belt and 
Road and questioned if they were an attempt to challenge the existing international order, 
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which is defined by the Bretton Woods system. Known as the AIIB and SRF, these 
multilateral institutions were designed by Beijing to be the financial arm of Belt and 
Road.207 As previously discussed, the debate around these institutions centers on their 
perceived intent and ability to challenge those western-led institutions already operating 
in the region, such as the ADB, World Bank, and IMF. Similar to the second aspect, I 
found that the inclusive nature of these institutions favors liberal motivations and makes 
it more likely that China is simply seeking to restructure and not replace the current 
international order. 
Realists fear that the institutions challenge western leadership by diminishing 
Washington’s role in South Asian affairs.208 By operating outside a U.S. veto, Beijing is 
capable of pushing an agenda counter to Washington’s goals.209 Public statements from 
the White House state that the U.S. has withheld its support of the institution over a lack 
of transparency within the organization.210 Liberals counter this fear by arguing that 
China’s actions are in response to needs that previous institutions have been unable to 
address. Through the AIIB, China is seeking to correct voting share disparity and fund a 
$750 million annual infrastructure gap throughout Asia.211 In addition, liberals point to 
the effects of such institutions as evidence that China is binding itself to the needs of the 
region. By creating a system in which China is bound to a vote that consists of all South 
Asian states, with the exception of Afghanistan and Bhutan, there are clear voluntary 
limits to China capabilities inside the system.212 
Like many of the other realist arguments, I again found it difficult to find 
evidence of a narrative that was not based on speculation. While it does appear to be true 
that China is attempting to redevelop a system that it is less tied to U.S. opinion, there is 
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little evidence to show that it intends to create a system in which China itself replaces the 
U.S. as the controlling vote—especially since it has chosen not to seek veto power in the 
AIIB.213 With Japan and the U.S. as the last significant hold outs, the admittance of India 
and other prominent regional players raises questions about the perceived fears these 
states might have of Beijing using these institutions to advance a Sino-centric agenda. 
Essentially, multilateral institutions are inclusive organizations rooted in cooperation and 
common development.214 It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which China is able to 
manipulate a multilateral development bank to push an agenda that only benefits China. 
E. CONCLUSION 
To date, China’s motivations are more consistent with a liberal interpretation. 
When judged independently, each of the four aspects show the liberal argument to be the 
more convincing assessment. Beginning with the notion that infrastructure advances a 
Sino-centric agenda, I found that there were just as many benefits for South Asia as a 
result of Chinese infrastructure over the past decade. In addition, this infrastructure has 
created an environment in which China has sought an equal relationship among all the 
South Asian states, and China’s growing involvement in multilateral institutions 
demonstrates a willingness by China to be a part of the regional community. 
Third, there is little evidence to support the “String of Pearls” theory, which 
argues that China is utilizing strategically placed, maritime infrastructure to encircle India 
and control Indian Ocean supply routes. Instead, it is far more plausible that these ports 
are used as refueling stations for the increase in Chinese shipping. Fourth, Beijing has 
taken great steps to ensure that its new financial institutions address the voting share 
disparity that it believes is an issue in the multilateral development banks of the Bretton 
Woods system. Coupled with Beijing’s decision to decline veto power in the AIIB, these 
are indications of a state seeking to self-regulate its own powers and promote 
connectivity and common development. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I set out to assess if China’s motivations behind the One Belt, One 
Road Initiative are more consistent with a realist or liberal lens. I conducted my research 
by creating a framework of four aspects that addressed the potential economic, 
geopolitical, or security related effects of the initiative on South Asia. The aspects 
challenged the ability of Belt and Road to: (1) advance China’s national interests 
throughout the region, (2) bind China and its neighbors politically and economically, (3) 
create possible overseas bases, and (4) disrupt current financial institutions and the 
regional order within South Asia. In the process of assessing each aspect, I based the 
strength of each argument on its ability to answer the following four questions: (1) does 
infrastructure only advance China’s national interest? (2) how influential does Belt and 
Road make China in South Asia? (3) how credible is the “String of Pearls” theory? (4) is 
China challenging the existing international and regional economic order in South Asia?  
By evaluating evidence through realist and liberal lenses and under this 
framework, I found that the liberal argument was more convincing based on the quality 
and quantity of evidence: (1) Belt and Road infrastructure does not appear to act as 
roadways for delivering a Sino-centric agenda to South Asia, (2) the inclusive nature of 
China’s programs, and its desire to join other multilateral institutions, will temper its 
ability to influence the region, (3) there is little evidence to support the development of a 
“String of Pearls,” and (4) China’s actions with the regional order indicate that Beijing is 
seeking to modify, not challenge, its multilateral institutions. 
This chapter will review the findings, discuss potential events or evidence that 
would alter my assessment, and conclude with comments on how South Asia and the 
United States should engage Belt and Road based on these conclusions. 
A. REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
From the evidence presented, it should be concluded that Belt and Road is first 
and foremost about economic growth. As discussed in Chapter II, with the Chinese 
economy trending from a production based to a service based market, there is an 
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increasing shift toward a Chinese GDP that is supported by domestic consumption and 
dependent on new avenues that increase the flow of goods and resources in and out of 
China.215 As demonstrated over the past decade and a half, the result of this growing 
demand is the need for infrastructure in a geopolitically significant region, South Asia. 
Based on this conclusion, the liberal narrative is more in line with this conclusion and is 
adequately supported by each of the four aspects reviewed.  
Assuming China is simply seeking economic opportunities through Belt and 
Road, then there is significant reason to conclude that  
1. It is beneficial for China to create a win-win environment 
2. China will seek opportunities to become involved in the region and bind 
itself to institutions that promote growth in South Asia 
3. China will not seek to tarnish its image of peaceful development by 
introducing military assets to this maritime infrastructure 
4. In regard to multilateral institutions, China’s actions are in response to 
global and regional changes that have occurred since the founding of the 
current order, and as a result, it is does not seek to revise, only retool these 
institutions to allow a greater voice to a new set of international players. 
1. Does Infrastructure Only Advance China’s National Interest? 
No, in the decade since China began reinvesting in South Asian infrastructure 
there have been clear economic gains by both China and the host nation. With trade 
increasing by over $45 billion from 2006–2011, there is reason to believe that an increase 
in infrastructure will continue to create additional benefits.216 In addition, if China 
continues to “free-ride” smaller littoral states by bank rolling significant expenses, as 
seen in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, I expect that Belt and Road will continue to meet its 
mission of greater connectivity and a win-win environment.217 Essentially, China’s need 
to transport greater quantities of resources is expanding market opportunities throughout 
the region and creating tangible gains for South Asian states. 
                                                 
215 Knowler, “So What Is China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Thing, Anyway?”  
216 Brunjes et al., “China’s Increased Trade and Investment in South Asia,” ix. 
217 Zhang Ynuling, “One Belt, One Road: A Chinese Overview.” 
 73
2. How Influential Does Belt and Road Make China in South Asia? 
While there is no denying the larger Chinese footprint Belt and Road 
infrastructure makes on South Asia, the result appears to be an increase in cooperative 
opportunities designed for the betterment of South Asia. The inclusive nature of 
programs like BCIM and AIIB, coupled with the willingness on the part of China to join 
pre-existing organizations like SAARC, demonstrates a conscious choice by Beijing to 
invest in local multilateral institutions and bind itself to decisions concerned with the 
region’s greater good.218 Despite fears that these actions might be Beijing’s attempt to 
garner enough support to begin dictating terms and directions, to this point, China has not 
displayed such intentions. Instead, it is more likely that China’s increased interest is the 
result of its own economic needs, which have proven to provide benefits to the region as 
well. 
3. How Credible Is the “String of Pearls” Theory? 
Based on the strength of evidence presented by liberal scholars, I did not find the 
“String of Pearls” theory to be credible. Overall, the realist arguments lacked substantial 
evidence and appeared to be based on speculation. Instead, the liberal arguments 
produced stronger evidence by highlighting the following: first, all but one “pearl” is 
capable of supporting major combat operations, and second, there is little strategic 
advantage for China to gain by dividing its naval assets and moving them into range of 
Indian air and missile capabilities.
219
 As previously stated, I concur that, “China’s 
‘pearls’ appear to be what Beijing says they are: conventional shipping facilities designed 
to connect China’s landlocked western provinces to maritime trade routes in the Indian 
Ocean.”220 
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4. Is China Challenging the Existing International and Regional 
Economic Order in South Asia? 
While realist argue that China’s new financial institutions challenge existing 
current global and regional institutions by diminishing Washington’s role in South Asian 
affairs, the structure and inclusive nature of these programs are better indicators that 
China’s motivations are more consistent with a liberal lens.221 Regarding the structure, 
with institutions like the AIIB being in a “traditional mold,” it demonstrates that China 
accepts the benefits of the current order and only seeks to modify it, as opposed to 
replacing it.222 Second, the inclusive nature of these institutions is not only voluntarily 
limiting China’s own power in regional affairs, but also increasing the power of regional 
competitors, such as India.223 Through these new inclusive institutions, it is more likely 
that China will modify current institutions to better reflect the global changes that have 
occurred since Bretton Wood’s founding 70 years ago. 
B. EVENTS THAT MIGHT ALTER THESE FINDINGS 
Due to the recent nature of Belt and Road and its subsequent projects, there are 
still opportunities for these conclusions to be reversed as the programs develop and 
stronger evidence presents itself. As a result, below is a summation of possible scenarios 
that I addressed in the thesis.  
First, in regard to the benefits Belt and Road provides to South Asia, evidence of 
continued liberal motivations come in the form of sustained increases in trade and market 
opportunities between China and South Asia, to include providing jobs to local 
communities. While this does not mean that all growth must be equal, there cannot be 
evidence of significant disproportionate GDP growth between China and host countries 
or rising debt between host countries and Chinese banks. 
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Second, in regard to aspects two and four, as China enters into new and current 
multilateral institutions, it must maintain its stance on voting parity. This will include not 
utilizing the influence of Belt and Road to manipulate voting shares or leaning on other 
members to select projects that heavily benefit China. It is imperative that Beijing not be 
found to be utilizing these institutions to drive a Sino-centric policy in South Asia. 
Finally, there must be no evidence that China is exploiting maritime infrastructure 
to develop overseas bases. China must hold to its public stance that they have not and 
will not build any overseas bases, and it must maintain a military strategy that does not 
seek hegemony or military expansion.224 Any indication of a militarization of the “String 
of Pearls” will immediately invalidate China’s argument, and I suspect, will unravel the 
tentative good nature between Beijing and New Delhi. 
C. MOVING FORWARD: HOW SHOULD SOUTH ASIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES REACT TO BELT AND ROAD? 
Based on the conclusion that the Belt and Road initiative is first and foremost 
about economic growth, the focus among all great powers involved in South Asian affairs 
should be to find ways to incorporate this growth into economically advantageous 
agreements. While the realist theory might argue that Beijing intends for this growth to 
be dictated by a purely Sino-centric agenda, I conclude that stronger evidence favors the 
belief that the interdependent nature of this initiative will drive the great powers involved 
to grow in a mutually beneficial and increasingly connected fashion. 
Nevertheless, the motivations of a single state cannot on its own dictate either a 
cooperative or a confrontational outcome. As Robert Jervis argued when discussing the 
security dilemma, “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security 
decrease the security of others.”225 Thus, by pursuing a course of action in which China 
gains political and economic influence within South Asia, regardless of the fact that its 
growth appears to be beneficial to the region, it will come as a challenge to those states 
already holding influence. Therefore, irrespective of China’s motivations, the perception 
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and reaction of other key players within the region will dictate the outcome to the same 
extent. For example, if New Delhi and Washington seek to increase their own military 
presence over misperceived increases of PLAN escort ships, continued competitive 
behavior will drive a scenario counter to China’s original motivations. 
The greatest threat to cooperation comes from the United States seeing this 
program as a challenge to a geopolitical strategy that has served Washington since the 
end of WWII. This national strategy, that utilized military, economic, political, and 
cultural aspects, sought to develop the world in manner that bound it to Washington and 
was protected under the strength of the American military.226 Coupled with India’s fear 
of encirclement by Chinese assets and maritime forces, Washington and New Delhi have 
the choice of fighting to maintain the status quo or embrace China’s rise and adjust policy 
to support it.227 
Nevertheless, by electing to involve itself in programs such as BCIM and the 
AIIB, New Delhi appears to be accepting of China’s rise and willing to cooperate, for 
now and in a limited capacity. As one Indian scholar stated, “in a nutshell, India aims for 
the normalization of its ties with China while trying to curb China’s ability to impinge on 
its geopolitical space and interests.”228 The United States would be wise to adopt a 
similar strategy and extend small gestures to show that it is willing to entertain aspects of 
Belt and Road and cooperate under a multilateral system, even if it is one that it did not 
create. 
This must begin with the U.S. joining the AIIB. First, if Washington is concerned 
over the transparency of the program, it has a far better chance of ensuring the bank, and 
Belt and Road, is controlled in an appropriate manner if it has a voice in the decision 
making process. Second, if in actuality, the reluctance is over a fear that China’s rise will 
result in the loss of American primacy, standing on the fringes of an institution that has 
already attracted significant global players does not make a strong statement. Despite 
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Washington’s best efforts, China’s growing presence in the region is on track to—at a 
minimum—prevent the United States from maintaining the benefits of the Bretton Woods 
system. If Washington continues to push for a continuation of the status quo, there is a 
strong chance that the relationship will spiral into a great power war.229  
Finally, with New Delhi already showing signs of a desire to increase economic 
and diplomatic relations with Beijing, Washington must recognize the shift occurring 
within South Asia and take action to accommodate China without sacrificing its own 
voice. This begins by becoming involved in AIIB and building off common values. By 
recognizing China as a friend in economic affairs, it is unlikely that Washington will be 
forced to deal with Beijing as a foe in military affairs.230 
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